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BITPROPERTY AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT 
CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET
 
ABSTRACT 
In the past several years, the growth of virtual property in today’s 
economy has been explosive. The everyday use of virtual assets, ranging 
from Twitter and Facebook to YouTube and virtual world accounts, is 
nearly absolute. Indeed, by one account, Americans check social media 
over seventeen times per day. Further, a growing number of savvy virtual 
entrepreneurs are reporting incomes in the six- and seven-figure range, 
derived solely from their online businesses. Nevertheless, although the 
commercial world has come to embrace these newfound markets, 
commercial law has done a poor job of keeping up. Scholars have argued 
that laws governing everything from taxation, to bankruptcy, to privacy 
rights have not kept pace with our ever-changing virtual world. And 
nowhere is this truer than in the law of secured credit. Doubtlessly, virtual 
property has come to represent significant wealth and importance, yet its 
value as a source of leveraged capital remains, in large part, untapped. 
This unrealized potential is not without good reason; the law—specifically 
Article 9 of the U.C.C. and the law of property more broadly—suffers from 
a number of deficiencies and anomalies that make the use of virtual 
property in secured credit transactions not only overly complex and 
expensive, but almost entirely untenable. This Article shines light on these 
shortcomings, and, in doing so, advances a number of guiding principles 
and specific legislative recommendations, all geared toward a reformation 
of the law of secured credit in virtual property.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“We need to make sure people trust the technology on their desks 
and in their pockets. And people won’t trust technology if they lose 
their rights when they hit the send button on an email. It’s important 
that we find ways to preserve our values while advancing 
technology.” 
—Brad Smith, General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation1  
Americans spend literally countless hours interfacing with virtual, or 
what one might call “bit” property.2 Whether scrolling through one’s 
Facebook newsfeed while waiting in the doctor’s office or posting a 
picture to Twitter while riding the elevator to work, the ubiquity of virtual 
property’s impact on everyday life is undeniable.3 According to one study, 
in 2015 alone Americans checked social media seventeen times a day, 
totaling nearly two hours of social media interaction in a 24-hour period.
4
 
Not only this, but the number of users of virtual property is huge.
5
 As of 
October 2016, there were 1.7 billion active Facebook users,
6
 73.5 million 
Pinterest users,
7
 and over 695 million Twitter accounts.
8
  
 
 
 1. Jeff Bennion, Who Owns Your Email? An Interview With Brad Smith, General Counsel Of 
Microsoft, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 18, 2015), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/who-owns-your-email-
an-interview-with-brad-smith-general-counsel-of-microsoft/ [https://perma.cc/P6NX-78MQ].  
 2. The term “bitproperty” was most prominently used by Professor Joshua Fairfield to describe 
digital or virtual assets and the theory and concepts that underpin them. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, 
BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 841 (2015) (“The limits of cyberproperty theory demonstrate the 
need for well-conceived online property systems.”).  
 3. See Maeve Duggan, Nicole B. Ellison, Cliff Lampe, Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, 
Social Media Update 2014, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014/; Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 
27, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/. 
 4. See Jason Mander, Daily Time Spent on Social Networks Rises to 1.72 Hours, GLOBAL WEB 
INDEX (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/daily-time-spent-on-social-networks-
rises-to-1-72-hours [https://perma.cc/49D3-94WE]; see also Lulu Chang, Americans Spend an 
Alarming Amount of Time Checking Social Media on Their Phones, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 13, 2015, 
6:32 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/informate-report-social-media-smartphone-use/ 
[https://perma.cc/T6EB-KYUT] (explaining that people in the United States check social media 
accounts seventeen times a day, and people in countries like Thailand and Mexico check their accounts 
up to forty times daily); NM INCITE & NIELSEN HOLDINGS N.V., STATE OF THE MEDIA—THE SOCIAL 
MEDIA REPORT 8 (2012) [hereinafter NIELSEN], http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/ 
en/reports-downloads/2012-Reports/The-Social-Media-Report-2012.pdf (explaining that the total 
minutes spent on social media apps like Facebook reach twenty-seven billion minutes a year). 
 5. See NIELSEN, supra note 4, at 8. 
 6. See Facebook Company Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/ 
facebook-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/LSJ8-FZRA] (last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
 7. See Pinterest Company Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/pinterest-
company-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/5RHJ-5LU4] (last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
 8. See Twitter Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Perhaps because of their ubiquity, websites are tremendously valuable 
in many respects. Hardly any campaign, organization, or cause can claim 
even a shred of credibility without its own domain name.
9
 Organizations 
spend a great deal of time, money, and human capital in determining the 
correct website name, branding, structure, and design.
10
 In fact, some SEC 
rules even require that certain information be specifically disclosed on a 
corporation’s website.11 Similarly, political campaigns will often purchase 
a number of different domain names when preparing to enter a political 
race.
12
 Some presence on the web, mostly through a website, is practically 
a prerequisite to relevance in today’s economy.13 The world of websites 
and their connected domain names is tremendous. At the end of 2013 there 
were a total of 271 million registered domain names, representing an 
increase of 18.5 million (or 7.3%) from 2012.
14
 While not all of these 
domain names come with a heavy price tag, many cost a substantial sum. 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/F738-KRG8] (last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
 9. See Charles Jackson, Importance of Having a Website, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/importance-having-website-48042.html [https://perma.cc/S8HZ-N2DU] 
(last visited April 10, 2015). 
 10. For a discussion of the constant need to keep websites updated and responsive in order to be 
economically competitive, see Eric Fischgrund, The Importance of Responsive Design for New 
Websites, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2015, 4:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-
fischgrund/the-importance-of-respons_1_b_6880800.html [https://perma.cc/ANR3-C6UK]. 
 11. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a)(2) (2016) (discussing disclosure by a corporation as to 
whether its definition of an independent director is on its website and provide a URL if it is). 
 12. Jackie Kucinich, Presidential Campaigns Buy Up Domain Names for 'Microsites', USA 
TODAY (Aug. 8, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-08-
07/romney-microsites-domain-names/56863680/1; see also Running for President? Better Name Your 
Website Domain Early, N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT (May 4, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www. 
nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/05/04/running-for-president-register-your-domain-names-early/ 
(“A message to anyone considering a political campaign: buy your domain names. Every possible one. 
And do so early. The latest example of a candidate who did not secure a website URL: Carly Fiorina, 
whose failure to register carlyfiorina.org allowed a group to use that Web address to host a site critical 
of her tenure at Hewlett-Packard on the day she announced her candidacy. The domain was only 
registered in December, well after rumors about Ms. Fiorina’s possible campaign had been 
circulating.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Kurt Schimmel, Darlene Motley, Stanko Racic, Gayle Marco & Mark Eschenfelder, 
The Importance of University Web Pages in Selecting a Higher Education Institution, 9 RES. HIGHER 
ED. J (2010), http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/10560.pdf; see also Nicole Leinbach-Reyhle, 3 
Reasons Websites Are Vital for Small Businesses, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nicoleleinbachreyhle/2014/09/29/websites-for-small-businesses/; TOM 
ROSENSTIEL, AMY MITCHELL, KRISTEN PURCELL & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, HOW 
PEOPLE LEARN ABOUT THEIR LOCAL COMMUNITY 22–28 (2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
files/old-media/Files/Reports/2011/Pew%20Knight%20Local%20News%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. 
 14. VeriSign, DOMAIN NAME INDUSTRY BRIEF, Apr. 2014, at 2, http://www.verisigninc.com/ 
assets/domain-name-report-april2014.pdf. 
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For instance, Insurance.com and Sex.com both sold in 2010 for $35.6 
million and $13 million, respectively.
15
 
But virtual property extends beyond these platforms to even more 
complex models. For instance, the worlds of There.com, Second Life, 
World of Warcraft, and similar systems are immensely popular.
 
With these 
platforms individuals can create their own virtual worlds—complete with 
mountains, fields, buildings, weather, and essentially anything the 
imagination can conjure—that work to turn the wheels of a digital 
economy.
16
  
As time goes on the realm of virtual property continues to grow and 
develop in ways that could hardly have been imagined when the digital 
age first began. And along with this growth has come an increasing 
recognition of the tremendous value of virtual property.
17
 Nevertheless, 
with traditional property law virtual property is a bit of a poor fit.
18
 It is 
different from tangible property in that although its various parts—
networks, cables, software, chips, servers, hardware, and other related 
technological items—all enjoy a level of physicality, the true value is not 
in these sundry parts, but rather in the intangible good and service that 
they can together produce.
19
 Virtual property has a number of other unique 
aspects. For instance, its value and utility often rely upon the recognition 
of the thing’s existence by other servers and users across a vast network 
 
 
 15. See Alyson Shontell, Million-Dollar URLS: The Most Expensive Domain Names of All Time, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 22, 2014; 4:08 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-
domain-names-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/Z4AT-R5HW]. 
 16. See The Second Life of Judge Richard A. Posner, NEW WORLD NOTES (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/12/the_second_life.html [https://perma.cc/9PWX-3XDW] (quoting 
Judge Posner, who says of the virtual world in Second Life: “If you buy an island, you have a 
counterpart to a physical property right; if you design a dress, you have or should have some kind of 
intellectual property right, if you want to motivate people to enter the world and transact in it.”). 
 17. See Avnita Lakhani, Introduction to COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD: 
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 7 (Avnita Lakhani ed., 2014) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD] (“Despite the fact that there may be some key differences 
between real world and virtual economies, these virtual economies have proven to be very profitable 
for real world persons and have significant real world implications for commercial transactions and 
commercial law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 18. See Fairfield, supra note 2, at 839 (“Yet traditional property law has struggled to find secure 
footing online. Traditional property, a system designed through a long tradition of common-law 
deliberation to govern interests in scarce and rival resources, did not seem at the time of the rise of the 
Internet to be immediately applicable to an environment in which many resources were neither scarce 
nor rival. At that time, the critical application of Internet technologies seemed to be unlimited 
duplication of non-scarce and non-rival information, rather than the frictionless transfer of scarce and 
rival resources. As a result, intellectual property, the law governing non-rival resources, became the 
dominant structure for online assets. Yet this structure is enormously inefficient for those who prefer 
to own rather than license.”). 
 19. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that can cover the globe.
20
 For instance, a Facebook account is only 
valuable to the extent that the Facebook corporation’s servers grant that 
account space and allow the user to upload and receive data.
21
 The same 
can be said of Twitter. And surely Second Life accounts and other virtual 
world-platforms can only exist by computers talking to computers and 
sharing data and information through both wired and unwired channels.
22
 
Even when conceptualized as purely an intangible asset, the law of 
property struggles with how and when bitproperty can be bought, sold, 
bequeathed, or otherwise transferred from one person to another.
23
 Is one 
free to alienate one’s Facebook or Twitter account? And for that matter, 
does one even really own such a thing? Or rather does the host company 
grant a mere license of use that allows the individual to create a profile, 
post pictures, and manipulate his newsfeed, but only for so long as the host 
company allows it? Or perhaps it is a mixture of all of the above that 
makes virtual property what we know today. 
In thinking about these questions, commercial and property law 
scholars have explored the complex world of bitproperty and how it might 
fit into existing legal schemes in the United States and abroad.
24
 One topic, 
however, that has been little discussed by commercial law scholars and 
commentators is what were to happen if a user desired to collateralize his 
particular piece of virtual property.
25
 Without question, virtual property is 
 
 
 20. CHARLES PETZOLD, CODE: THE HIDDEN LANGUAGE OF COMPUTER HARDWARE AND 
SOFTWARE (2000). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See generally RON WHITE, HOW COMPUTERS WORK: THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
(10th ed. 2015). 
 23. See Christopher J. Cifrino, Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, Not 
Property Law, Must Be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds, 55 B.C. L. REV. 235 
(2014) (suggesting that contract law, not property law, is more competent to deal with virtual worlds). 
 24. See generally Fairfield, supra note 2, at 806 (theorizing digital property as an "information 
communication and storage system”); Jennifer Gong, Note, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property 
in International Treaties, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101 (2011) (suggesting a new international treaty 
be established to deal with virtual property and interests specifically); M. Scott Boone, Virtual 
Property and Personhood, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 715 (2008) (applying 
Margaret Jane Radin’s personhood theory to virtual world property); Victoria Blachly, Uniform 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act: What UFADAA Know, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2015, at 8, 9 
(discussing the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act of 2014 and how it would “extend a 
fiduciary’s authority over a person’s traditional assets to include the person’s digital assets”); Sandi S. 
Varnado, Your Digital Footprint Left Behind at Death: An Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law 
Behind, 74 LA. L. REV. 719 (2014) (proposing that both federal and state action is required to handle 
the numerous legal issues triggered by digital assets). 
 25. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The End of the (Virtual) World, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 81–87 
(2009) (providing one of the few scholarly discussions on the topic of virtual asset collateralization 
within the context of the bankruptcy of virtual worlds); see also Steven Chang, Note, Collateral 
Damage: Insecurity Assets in the Rising Virtual Age of E-Commerce, 2 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/7
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valuable
26—and that is particularly true in the business and entrepreneurial 
sense: the context which concerns this Article. For instance, people use 
social media, surf the web, and spend time in Second Life on a regular 
basis
27—and that presents an opportunity for businesses and entrepreneurs 
to engage with their potential customers through these mediums. The 
results of making use of this opportunity are valuable. Most of the value 
likely is tied to the ongoing nature of the virtual or online business (such 
as with a virtual shop in Second Life), but sometimes the use’s value can 
be divorced from the business (such as with URL website addresses). 
Regardless, the value that a business gets from making use of these 
opportunities is value that businesses may want to borrow against on a 
securitized basis. To that point, what would happen if a lender, eager to 
extend credit but equally concerned with collateralizing the debt, wanted 
the virtual entrepreneur to grant a security interest in his Facebook 
account, Second Life account, or website domain name?
28
 Could this be 
done? Should it be done? And, if it should, what body of law would 
apply?
29
 Further, can such a task be effective against third parties and 
therefore give the creditor the legal preference upon which secured lending 
so heavily relies?  
The most obvious contender to govern these types of transactions is the 
law in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. 9).
30
 Since 
U.C.C. 9 covers personal property that is otherwise generally intangible, 
and since all virtual property meets this general definition, the provisions 
of this widely adopted statutory framework seem most appropriate. There 
is some argument to be made, however, that virtual property should not be 
able to be securitized. In other words, perhaps societal goals—such as 
 
 
INTERNET 67 (2011) (discussing virtual property security through the narrow lens of foreclosure and 
enforcement). 
 26. See generally COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD, supra note 17 
(discussing the immensely value that virtual transactions have come to represent in the digital 
economy). 
 27. See supra note 4.  
 28. See Brent R. Cohen & Thomas D. Laue, Acquiring and Enforcing Security Interests in 
Cyberspace Assets, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 423, 433 (2001); Jonathan C. Krisko, U.C.C. Revised 
Article 9: Can Domain Names Provide Security for New Economy Businesses?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1178, 
1185–88 (2001). 
 29. See generally Adam Chase, A Primer on Recent Domain Name Disputes, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
3 (1998) (discussing recent disputes in domain names and how traditional legal principles were applied 
to these new areas of dispute); Paul J.N. Roy, John P. Brockland & John F. Lawlor, Security Interests 
in Technology Assets and Related Intellectual Property: Practical and Legal Considerations, 16 
COMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1999, at 3 (discussing whether intellectual property law should apply to 
technology and technology-related companies). 
 30. See generally U.C.C. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2014). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
656 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:649 
 
 
 
 
spurring creativity and challenging existing norms with an aim toward 
greater efficiency—may be frustrated by allowing virtual property to serve 
as collateral. This Article argues that such arguments are misplaced due to 
the fact that using U.C.C. 9 to facilitate this type of secured transaction 
furthers larger U.C.C. and public policy goals, such as increasing the flow 
of credit and augmenting the potential for economic growth and further 
innovation. By allowing for the collateralization of virtual property under 
U.C.C. 9 one can translate the value and uniqueness of these assets into 
further wealth and capital creation. Approaching virtual property from this 
perspective—rather than viewing it as being too idiosyncratic or singular 
to serve as collateral—furthers not only the purpose of U.C.C. 9 but is also 
aligned with the spirit of innovation that underpins bitproperty in general. 
As Margaret Jane Radin once posited, certain types of property—even 
while in large supply and abundant—can become so valuable to society 
that the underwriting of their “propertization” is warranted.31 As discussed 
further below, virtual property fits that bill and conceptualizing it as 
property that can be used in secured credit transactions is more than 
merited.
32
 
However, U.C.C. 9, much like the law governing property,
33
 presents a 
number of issues when it comes to intangible assets,
34
 and particularly 
virtual property. In general, one perfects a security interest in general 
intangibles merely by filing a financing statement in the jurisdiction where 
the debtor is located.
35
 But when recognition of the collateral by third 
parties—both for its value and utility, as well as its very existence—is 
essential, does this generalized process suffice? Admittedly, there are 
other forms of intangible personal property that have required the creation 
of special rules that operate in conjunction or outside U.C.C. 9 in order for 
collateralization to be possible—such as with patents, copyrights, and 
other forms of intellectual property.
36
 But in other cases where courts have 
been confronted with unusual forms of general intangible collateral—such 
 
 
 31. Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 517 (1996). 
 32. See infra Part I and accompanying discussion. 
 33. See Fairfield, supra note 2, at 839. 
 34. See generally Christopher K. Odinet, Testing the Reach of UCC Article 9: The Question of 
Tax Credit Collateral in Secured Transactions, 64 S. C. L. REV. 143 (2012) (describing the difficulty 
experienced by courts when met with instances where parties have attempted to collateralize tax 
credits—a form of intangible property). 
 35. U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 307 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2014). 
 36. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Revised Article 9 and Intellectual Property Asset Financing, 53 
ME. L. REV. 287 (2001) (describing revisions to secured lending law in order to facilitate IP 
financing). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/7
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as tax credits and a number of common place digital assets—they have 
adopted divergent views.
37
 Further, the ability to use and enjoy many of 
the rights of virtual property is made possible by license agreements, 
which make creditor enforcement quite difficult.
38
 In essence, the one-
size-fits-all approach that U.C.C. 9 adopts with regard to general 
intangibles has never been particularly strong in a broad sense, and it is 
acutely weak with regards to virtual property.
39
  
This Article explores the idea of virtual property as a form of security 
and challenges the effectiveness of current law in providing a legally 
sufficient vehicle for its collateralization. Part I gives an overview of the 
rise of virtual property, specifically highlighting the form, substance, and 
value of its major types. Part II discusses secured credit broadly, 
specifically under the U.C.C. 9 regime, and describes the law that 
currently governs the collateralization of general intangibles, including 
intellectual property, which is most analogous to rights in virtual property. 
After describing the U.C.C. 9 framework, Part III analyzes and critiques 
this system and points out its many insufficiencies when it comes to 
addressing bitproperty credit transactions. Lastly, Part IV sets forth 
guiding principles and makes specific recommendations for the 
development of a new legal framework that might be devised for virtual 
property in secured credit transactions. This Article concludes by arguing 
that the adoption of a new framework built upon these principles can 
improve and bring clarity and stability to the current legal uncertainty 
regarding the use of bitproperty in secured credit relationships.  
I. THE RISE OF BITPROPERTY AND ITS VALUE 
One of the main reasons virtual property causes such vexation in the 
law is that traditional property concepts and even more modern 
commercial law institutions are ill-equipped to deal with it. Property, as a 
general proposition, adheres to a very conservative view of the world and 
prefers static and unchanging rules that provide certainty and stability in 
property-related transactions.
40
 This is true particularly with respect to real 
 
 
 37. Compare Chicago v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) with 
Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 38. See infra Part III.A. 
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. See Fairfield, supra note 2 at 810–11; see also, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The 
Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 
(2009). As an example of property’s sometimes rigid rules, take the example of the race recording 
system that exists in some American jurisdictions. Under this scheme a purchaser who knows the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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property, but also in the context of personal property as well.
41
 Indeed, of 
all areas of the law, property is arguably one of the least dynamic and, for 
this reason, has been the subject of great scholarly debate regarding the 
foundational principles that underlie the system itself.
42
  
In the face of this relatively immovable body of law, virtual property is 
an outsider. While it can be compellingly argued that it is a form of 
personal property, its intangible nature makes it hard to consistently apply 
simple rules to its use and alienability.
43
 This is particularly true due to the 
fact that its value is inherently contingent and its ownership often 
uncertain because of the way it interfaces with contract concepts.
44
 In 
order to better understand virtual property and its uneasy fit within the 
traditional property system, the following discussion focuses on virtual 
property broadly, and then gives an overview of some of its more salient 
examples. 
A. Overview of BitProperty 
Before one can think about virtual property as a form of collateral, it is 
necessary to define what exactly virtual property is. Society often wants to 
think of virtual property as being spatial in that it takes up space and has 
some physicality, even if only in the most ethereal sense.
45
 And to some 
extent, there is some truth to this notion of spatial existence. As one of the 
most noteworthy virtual property scholars, Professor Joshua Fairfield, 
notes, “a chat room is, in many ways, similar to a conference room; a URL 
 
 
property was already conveyed to another person can nevertheless become the owner of it (despite his 
bad faith) if he records his deed into the real estate records of the county before the first purchaser is 
able. See Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System, 
PROB. & PROP., May/June 1989, at 27 (giving an overview of the recording statutes in the United 
States); see also McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100 (La. 1909) (exemplifying the harshness of the rule 
that even a bad faith purchaser who records his deed first becomes the owner of the property). 
 41. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 
(1998) (discussing the importance of the power of exclusive dominion over all property, in all its 
forms, as being the cornerstone of ownership). 
 42. See John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 
89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743–52 (2011) (summarizing the property theory debate); see also THOMAS W. 
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 15–22 (2d ed. 2012). See 
generally Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. 
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009) (setting forth the 
major tenets of the progressive property movement). 
 43. See infra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
 44. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing issues relative to third party control and license rights). 
 45. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (2005) (“. . . 
[P]roperty rights in virtual property are emerging as the software networks take on new characteristics 
- those of actual spaces and objects”). 
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is similar to real estate in the real world.”46 Other commentator notes that 
“most virtual property is deliberately designed to behave like traditional 
property.”47 Jeff Leblanc notes that “[v]irtual property is a non-tangible 
digital asset that meets many of the characteristics of more traditional 
forms of property.”48 In many ways virtual property is built upon basic 
property principles. As Judge Easterbrook noted in the late 1990s, “the law 
of cyberspace was no different than writing about the law of horses. There 
is no ‘law of the horse.’ The horse is just an animal governed by the laws 
that governed everything else.”49 
1. A Techie’s “Bundle of Sticks” Analogy  
In fact, one can, in some sense, describe virtual property very much 
through the lens of many traditional property concepts that are quite 
familiar to the property law canon. Professor Fairfield has famously 
described virtual property as having three defining characteristics: general 
rivalrousness, persistence, and interconnectivity.
50
 Essential to 
understanding these concepts is to know something about the concept of 
“computer code” or, put simply, “code.”51 Code is a mode of 
communication between computer programs, which is often described as 
consisting of methods, data structures, and algorithms, that allow various 
parties to exchange information concisely and efficiently.
52
 As one scholar 
put it, “[c]omputer source code is the lifeblood of the Internet. It is also the 
brick and mortar of cyberspace.”53 And without the computer to act as 
conduit, “source code is simply an array of symbols, letters, and 
 
 
 46. See id. 
 47. Charles Blazer, Note, The Five Incidica of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 137, 140 
(2006). 
 48. Jeff W. Leblanc, The Pursuit of Virtual Life, Liberty, and Happiness and its Economic and 
Legal Recognition in the Real World, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 255, 256 (2008). 
 49. Greg Lastowka, Paving the Path of Cyberlaw, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (citing 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207). 
 50. Fairfield, supra note XX, at 1054. 
 51. See generally CHARLES PETZOLD, supra note 20 (describing the operation of computer code); 
NELL DALE & JOHN LEWIS, COMPUTER SCIENCE ILLUMINATED (5th ed. 2013) (giving further 
explication of source code and its role in data sharing). 
 52. See Bernard E. Nodzon, Jr., Free Speech in a Digital Economy: An Analysis of How 
Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Elevated at the Expense of Free Speech, 36 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 109, 116–117 (2002); see also Ryan Christopher Fox, Old Law and New Technology: The 
Problem of Computer Code and the First Amendment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 871 (2002) (describing the 
interaction of computer code with free speech concerns). 
 53. Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source Code in the Age of 
YouTube, Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 319 (2012). 
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numbers.”54 The computer, however, in processing the code, can “monitor 
and control application programs running on the computer, to read other 
programs, and to manage data.”55 
In turning back to Fairfield’s description of virtual property, he states 
that code can be rivalrous in that, if the programmer so wishes, the concept 
of exclusion can exist with virtual property.
56
 If so designed, code that 
grants to someone a particular email address can only be accessed by that 
particular person.
57
 No one else can have that exact email address.
58
 A 
similar concept exists in the way of domain names.
59
 A specific website’s 
code is usually created once and cannot be replicated.
60
 For instance, “[i]f 
person A owns a given internet address, person B cannot put her website 
up at that address.”61 This particular characteristic is incredibly similar to 
the fundamental right of exclusion that underpins traditional property 
theory.
62
 The U.S. Supreme Court has often held that the right to exclude 
is the most universal and fundamental element of all property law.
63
 As 
Professor Thomas Merrill, one of the great property scholars of the 
twenty-first century, states, “[T]he right to exclude is the sine qua non of 
property.”64 In other words, “[g]ive someone the right to exclude others 
from a valued resource . . . and you give them property. Deny someone the 
 
 
 54. John P. Collins, Jr., Case Note, Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2694 (1997). 
 55. Id.; see also James J. Carter, Comment, The Devil and Daniel Bernstein: Constitutional 
Flaws and Practical Fallacies in the Encryption Export Controls, 76 OR. L. REV. 981, 997–99 (1997) 
(discussing how source code, which is readable by humans, is then translated into a binary code of 
numerals known as object code that only computers can read). 
 56. See Fairfield, supra note XX, at 1053–55.  
 57. See id. at 1054. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Jerry L. Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: The Right to Exclude, 
56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 539 (2006) (describing the right to exclude across legal systems); Eric R. Claeys, 
The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral: A Response to Parchomovsky & Stein, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 391 (2010) (expanding on the right to exclude as a theory of property); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823 (2009) 
(describing the right to exclude in the context of trespass actions); John A. Lovett, The Right to 
Exclude Meets the Right of Responsible Access: Scotland’s Bold Experiment in Public Access 
Legislation, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2012, at 52 (describing the limitations of the right to exclude 
under Scotland’s land reform legislation).  
 63. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 n.11 (1979) (“As stated by Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, [a]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from 
enjoying it.” (quoting Int’l News Serv. V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting))). For similar decisions by lower federal courts, see United States v. Pueblo of San 
Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 
1961). 
 64. Merrill, supra note 41, at 752. 
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exclusion right and they do not have property.”65 In this way, virtual 
property shares this attribute. The exclusive ability to use one’s email 
address, website domain name, Facebook account, or Twitter handle 
makes these items valuable to society. The fundamentals of the code 
creating these items prevent their duplication.
66
 
Fairfield also describes virtual property as being persistent, in that is 
does not normally fade, decay, wear, or disappear through persistent use.
67
 
Once code is created, it theoretically lasts forever.
68
 In other words, virtual 
property represents a form of nonconsumable in that regardless of how 
many times, how long, or by whom it is utilized, its substance will not be 
diminished or used up (although it may, like traditional property, change 
forms
69
). Fairfield compares this to a statue in a town square that, once 
erected, will ostensibly last forever and stand the test of time, absent other 
variables.
70
 He also notes that virtual property’s persistence characteristics 
are not spatially limited either.
71
 The property can often be used and 
accessed at various different locales and through various vehicles, even at 
the very same time.
72
 For instance, one can access a Twitter account on a 
smart phone, while someone else with the user name and password for that 
handle can also access the account on a laptop, both doing so at the same 
time and in different places. 
Lastly, all virtual property is interconnected.
73
 Just like how property in 
the real world can impact how other real-world property is experienced, 
multiple people can experience virtual property at the same time.
74
 
Fairfield uses the example of a website whereby although one person may 
have control over the content of the site and its design, countless others 
can view, interact with, and otherwise experience the website 
simultaneously.
75
 
Putting these characteristics together, one can see how virtual property 
has the potential for incredible value, much in the same way and for the 
 
 
 65. Id. at 730. 
 66. See Fairfield, supra note XX, at 1056. 
 67. See id. at 1054. 
 68. Id.  
 69. WALTER GREINER, LUDWIG NEISE & HORST STÖCKER, THERMODYNAMICS AND 
STATISTICAL MECHANICS 33, 41 (Dirk Rischke trans. 1995) (explaining the rule of conservation of 
energy that is derived from the first law of thermodynamics, stating that energy can be neither created 
nor destroyed, but can energy can change forms and may energy flow from one place to another.). 
 70. Fairfield, supra note 56, at 1054. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
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same reasons as traditional property. The rivalrous/exclusionary nature of 
virtual property allows, by design, a market for the sale, transfer, and use 
of the property to come into existence since the law, or rather the code, can 
be designed so as to prevent others from intruding into the owner’s 
exclusive use of and dominion over the property.
76
 Similarly, the 
persistence or perpetual aspect of virtual property allows the owner to 
invest in and expend resources on the digital asset—usually in an effort to 
increase its value or capacity—with the confidence of knowing that the 
property will remain constant.
77
 And lastly, the interconnectedness of 
property allows others, aside from the owner or controller, to use, interact, 
and generally avail themselves of it and thereby create a marketplace and 
the accompanying demand that creates value.
78
 
2. A Poor Fit for Traditional Property Frameworks 
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways in which virtual property is 
not like traditional property. For instance, as Professor Fairfield notes, 
while some virtual property is rivalrous, it would be untrue to say that all 
share this characteristic.
79
 Indeed, many forms of virtual property can be 
duplicated an infinite number of times if the code so allows.
80
 Further, the 
very value of virtual property is inherently tied to computers talking with 
other computers. Without this form of cyber communication, the entire 
structure of the “property” at issue would be worthless and essentially 
nonexistent. In other words, the existence of the property depends entirely 
upon the act of one or more third parties, and the thing cannot maintain its 
existence without such acknowledgment. Moreover, the fact that many 
virtual assets are intertwined with rights under a license contract makes 
this type of property interest subject to many more contingencies than 
what is experienced with other, more traditional, assets.
81
 Thus, the 
interconnectedness of virtual assets has more and different facets than seen 
in traditional tangible property. 
 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 1055. 
 79. See id. at 1053. 
 80. Oliver Herzfeld, What Is The Legal Status Of Virtual Goods?, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2012, 1:09 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2012/12/04/what-is-the-legal-status-of-virtual-goods/. 
 81. See Fairfield, supra note XX, at 1050 n.6 (“[V]irtual property is governed under a regime 
where initial rights are allocated to intellectual property holders, and subsequent rights are governed by 
license agreements . . . .”). 
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Further, the persistence of virtual property goes far beyond the 
persistence of tangible assets envisioned by Fairfield. While it is true that a 
statue in a town square will ostensibly last forever, in reality wear, tear, 
and decay will eventually play a role in diminishing the substance of the 
object. Virtual assets, on the other hand, truly can last forever because of 
the lack of physicality, and therefore corporeal deterioration.  
B. The Matter and the Money of BitProperty 
In order to better understand the non-traditional nature and the 
incredible value of virtual property, the following sections provide a 
discussion of the nuts and bolts of a number of major categories of virtual 
property. Moreover, the following sections highlight the wealth and 
economic resources that these virtual assets both represent and produce. 
1. Website Domain Names 
The easiest virtual assets to start with are website URLs. Websites 
represent a virtual asset of enormous importance and value.
82
 Essentially a 
website—or a domain name, more specifically—is the gateway to the 
Internet.
83
 Without a domain name, one cannot achieve access to the many 
things the web has to offer.
84
  
Although not quite a perfect analogy, the “landlord” for all domain 
names across the globe is a non-profit, semi-governmental entity known as 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
85
 
This organization, created under the corporate laws of the state of the 
California, basically regulates the functioning of the Internet.
86
 Its most 
important task is to make sure the system for registering and tracking 
domain names is kept up to date and stable, in coordination with a number 
of domain name registrars. As Sprankling notes, “A domain name is 
essentially the address for a particular computer server, which functions as 
a portal by allowing all Internet users to interact with the content on that 
server.”87 Without ICANN’s involvement, computers and servers would 
 
 
 82. See e.g., Andrew Allemann, Domain Holdings Reports $4.75 Million Domain Name Sales in 
Q1, DOMAIN NAME WIRE (May 12, 2015), http://domainnamewire.com/2015/05/12/domain-holdings-
reports-4-75-million-domain-name-sales-in-q1/. 
 83. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 89–90 (2014). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id.; see also INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, https://www.icann.org 
[https://perma.cc/P88A-KMJH] (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 87. SPRANKLING, supra note 83, at 90. 
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not be able to communicate and share information with one another—
essentially, there would be no Internet. Sprankling argues that, “[i]n a 
broad sense, ICANN effectively subdivides cyberspace and assigns rights 
to use portions of that ‘space.’”88 
Unlike many of the other forms of virtual property—whereby the 
company that owns the social media platform or the virtual world program 
is the sole regulator of that particular asset—domain names are somewhat 
privately and also somewhat publicly controlled.
89
 ICANN, through a 
contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce, operates the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority that serves the role of domain name 
allocator and data keeper.
90
  
The actual legal nature of domain names as a form of property, as 
articulated by Professor Sprankling, is somewhat unresolved.
91
 On the one 
hand, some view them as mere contracts between ICANN and the user.
92
 
But a more favored approach, so argues Sprankling, is to consider them 
under the law of property.
93
 In fact, at least one U.S. federal circuit court 
has held that a domain name is “an intangible property right” and has 
declared that such a right is similar to “staking a claim to a plot of land” 
and then recording title to it in a registry system to put others on notice.
94
 
Similarly, U.S. bankruptcy courts have held that rights in a domain name 
are deemed assets of the bankrupt estate.
95
 In this way, domain names are 
quite similar to holding title to land, albeit intangible, and one might easily 
imagine how other aspects of property law—such as those involving 
encumbrances like mortgages and U.C.C. 9—might similarly be 
incorporated into this conception of the nature of domain names.  
 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 80–90 
 90. Id. at 89 
 91. See id. at 90 
 92. See SPRANKLING, supra note 83, at 90. See also WARREN E. AGIN, BANKRUPTCY AND 
SECURED LENDING IN CYBERSPACE § 2:28 (2014) (“Possibly, the domain name registration is like a 
street address listing; the post office provides a mechanism for describing where you are and 
acknowledges that you are there, but exercises no control over your right to be there. Similarly, 
Verisign and other domain name registries' roles may be limited to operating Internet machinery and 
keeping track of which domain name is identified with which server. As a mere address, a domain 
name may have no real value because it does not constitute a property right.”); Oppedahl & Larson v. 
Network Sols., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Colo. 1998) (taking a contract-based view of a domain 
name right); Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999) (same). 
 93. See SPRANKLING supra note 83, at 90. 
 94. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Larry Koenig & Assoc., LLC, Nos. 01-12829, 03-1063, 2004 WL 3244582, at 
*6–7 (Bankr. M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2004) (finding that the domain name is an asset that belongs to the 
debtor company). 
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When the Internet was first taking shape, most businesses and 
companies thought very little of domain names, and certainly did not think 
they were of any significant value.
96
 That however, has changed 
dramatically over time.
97
 Domain names go for big money, sometimes in 
the millions.
98
 For instance, in 2015 adopting.com sold for $125,000 and 
mera.com sold for $132,000.
99
 And with a bigger sticker price, 345.com 
sold for $800,000 and porno.com sold for $8.8 million.
100
  
Further, it is not always the use of the domain name by a company that 
signifies its value. Rather, holding a domain name that someone else wants 
can, in and of itself, generate immense value.
101
 To that end, a number of 
companies hold domain names for purely investment purposes. For 
instance, in 1998, Compaq Computer Corp. paid AltaVista Technology 
Inc. over $3 million for the domain name “Altavista.com.”102 AltaVista, a 
small company in the computer digital-imaging business, had registered 
the domain name before Digital Equipment Corporation developed its 
AltaVista search engine.
103
 Domain names are sold and transferred from 
holder to holder by working with the individual ICANN-affiliated registrar 
with whom the domain name is connected.
104
 Essentially, the process 
operates such that the registrar of the domain name transfers control of it 
from one holder to another, with often large sums of money being passed 
back and forth.
105
   
 
 
 96. See AGIN, supra note 92, at § 2:23. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Melanie Cohen, Sex.com Seeks to Sell Itself for $13 Million, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2010/10/21/sexcom-seeks-to-sell-itself-for-13-million/ (“The bankrupt 
owner of Sex.com is seeking to sell the domain name to offshore holding company Clover Holdings 
Ltd. for a hot $13 million.”). 
 99. Six New Domains Complete Our Final 2015 Top 100 Domain Sales Chart, DOMAIN 
INDUSTRY NEWS MAG. http://www.dnjournal.com/archive/domainsales/2015/2015-top-100-sales-
charts.htm (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See AGIN, supra note 92, at § 2:23. 
 102. Christopher S. Lee, The Development of Arbitration in the Resolution of Internet Domain 
Name Disputes, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2000). 
 103. Compaq Buys AltaVista Domain, CNET (Aug. 11, 1998), https://www.cnet.com/news/ 
compaq-buys-altavista-domain/. For a discussion of businesses that speculate in domain names in 
anticipation of big returns when the URLs come into high demand, see Malia Wollen, Marijuana Web 
Names Snapped Up, in Case of Legalization, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/10/28/us/28pot.html; Saul Hansell, Domaining: A Field Guide, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2007, 
6:13 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/domaining-a-field-guide/. 
 104. Id. at § 2:32. 
 105. Id.  
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2. Virtual World Accounts 
The newest—or at least the most dynamic—type of bitproperty comes 
from the virtual worlds. These are digital environments/communities 
where individual users “come to play, trade, create, and socialize.”106 
These platforms allow individuals—typically through a computer 
customized graphic rendering known as an avatar—to form friendships, 
establish romantic relationships, purchase and sell property, build and 
construct improvements and terrains, engage in role play, participate in 
social networks, and essentially live out a part of their lives in an online 
reality.
107
  
There are a number of virtual world platforms that vary in their content 
and gameplay.
108
 But for purposes of this Article, the virtual world 
platform that best exemplifies the potential value of this particular type of 
bitproperty is that of Second Life.
109
 Aptly named, it essentially embodies 
the idea of all the virtual world platforms—a place where one can go and 
be whatever they want, do whatever they want, and create a world around 
them that meets their whims and desires.
110
 Second Life was developed 
and is owned by a company called Linden Labs, which launched the 
virtual world in 2003.
111
  
The way the Second Life economy works is by allowing users to 
exchange money for various goods and services across the different 
worlds that comprise Second Life. For instance, one user may digitally 
 
 
 106. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2004). 
 107. Id. at 5–6. 
 108. Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted) (“In South Korea, the game Lineage is currently more popular 
than television, with some four million registered participants. In the United States, EverQuest's 
Norrath is the most popular virtual world, with over 440,000 subscribers at last count. Ultima Online 
and Dark Age of Camelot are serious competitors, having 250,000 and 200,000 participants, 
respectively.”). For instance, ourWorld is a virtual world for teens that allows the user to create his 
own world by playing other users in a series of games. OURWORLD, http://web2. 
ourworld.com/ow/?env=home [https://perma.cc/U2AW-WUJT] (last visited May 26, 2015). In Meez, 
the user can explore different regions of a large, real-life neighborhood community and hangout and 
chat with other avatars. MEEZ, http://www.meez.com [https://perma.ccQZJ2-MTVM] (last visited 
May 26, 2015). For an entirely different experience, avatars in the form of knights, orcs, wizards, and 
other mythical creatures can battle, fight, and form relationships with one another in a large multi-
player quest-centered virtual world known as the World of Warcraft. WORLD OF WARCRAFT, 
http://us.battle.net/wow/en/ [https://perma.cc/U6NY-P4WE] (last visited May 26, 2015).  
 109. Who We Are, LINDEN LAB, http://www.lindenlab.com/about (last visited May 30, 2015); see 
also Terms of Service, LINDEN LAB, http://www.lindenlab.com/tos [https://perma.cc/GB7V-QUER] 
(last visited May 31, 2015). 
 110. See Living a Second Life, ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2006), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/7963538. 
 111. See Who We Are, supra note 109. 
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construct an elaborate structure (a castle, penthouse, villa, or other 
residential improvement) using their particular skill and creativity and can 
then put this structure up for sale.
112
 The Second Life Marketplace website 
also provides a way to access the LindeX Currency Exchange system 
whereby the user can purchase or sell Linden dollars in exchange for real-
world currency.
113
 For instance, $1 U.S. dollar will purchase about 250 
Linden dollars, taking into account a very slight exchange rate 
fluctuation.
114
 If a user wants to sell Linden Dollars, they access the 
LindeX and then enter the amount of Linden dollars for sale.
115
 The 
system will then match the seller with individuals who desire to purchase 
Linden dollars.
116
  
It is worth noting that the Second Life economy is not insignificant. In 
2014 alone, users “cashed out over $60 million . . . by selling their Linden 
Dollars for good old USD.”117 With about 600,000 active users, and 
assuming that about 20% of them are engaged in the buying and selling of 
goods and services on Second Life (and exchanging Linden dollars for 
U.S. currency), that equates to a “very very rough guess” of a $500 
average payout.
118
 According to Linden Lab’s Chief Executive Officer in a 
2015 interview, “[t]here's a woman in New Zealand who makes hundreds 
of thousands of dollars making hands and feet for avatars and feeds her 
family by doing that.”119 By another account, in 2009 one Second Life 
user “makes close to $1 million a year” making avatar shoes.120  
The buying and selling of goods is not, however, the only way in which 
a Second Life user can monetize her virtual world experience. Users can 
 
 
 112. See Lawsuit Over Video Game Furniture, 9 NO. 7 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 13 (2007); Elizabeth 
Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy Experiment: Second Life, Virtual Property, and a 1L 
Property Course, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 915, 926 (2008). 
 113. Buy L$, SECOND LIFE, https://secondlife.com (log in to Second Life account; then follow 
“Buy L$” hyperlink under “Linden Exchange” in the left column) (last visited May 30, 2015). 
 114. See id.; Grace Wong, How Real Money Works in Second Life, CNNMONEY (Dec. 8, 2006, 
12:15 PM). http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/08/technology/sl_lindex/ [https://perma.cc/4pjg-t6x8]. 
 115. See Buy L$, supra note 113; Wong, supra note 114.  
 116. See Buy L$, supra note 113.  
 117. James Au Wagner, Second Life Content Creators Cashed Out $60M Last Year, Says Linden 
CEO, NEW WORLD NOTES (May 20, 2015), http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2015/05/second-life-economy-
feet-and-hands.html [https://perma.cc/XW8X-VSRG]. 
 118. Id.  
 119. See id.  
 120. Id. (“Notably, Linden Lab also once reported that a maker of Second Life avatar shoes makes 
close to $1 million a year.”); see also James Au Wagner, Top Second Life Entrepreneur Cashing Out 
US $1.7 Million Yearly; Furnishings, Events Management Among Top Earners, NEW WORLD NOTES 
(Mar. 24, 2009), http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2009/03/million.html [https://perma.cc/XSF2-53EV] 
(explaining that the top ten earners on Second Life include a company that “designs virtual goods 
including shoes”). 
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also rent or acquire their own real estate.
121
 The “land” itself merely 
represents space on the Second Life servers that individuals can come to 
acquire rights in for a limited duration.
122
 But, practically speaking, within 
the virtual world this server space manifests itself as actual acreage. To 
acquire rights in land in Second Life, a user can “rent” the land from 
Linden Labs or from some other renter of land for a weekly or monthly 
price.
123
  
One purpose of having land in Second Life is that it gives the user a 
place to customize her surroundings and make them look like whatever 
she desires.
124
 One can “invite friends to hang out, hold events,” and even 
build a “a house, a garden, or an entire forest.”125 But another purpose, and 
one that drives a large part of the Second Life economy, involves the 
selling or renting out of land by users to other users.
126
  
Owners set a rental rate and through skillful marketing enter into term 
agreements with other users.
127
 These tenant-users can then, in turn, sublet 
the land to other users.
128
 In many ways, this system of estates in land is 
very much like the traditional English common law feudal system that 
gave birth to the United States’ law of property.129 Linden Labs, as the 
monarch, owns the actual land itself through its server space, but grants 
various rights to users (lords) who then rent those rights down to other 
users (vassals) and so on to others (farmers/peasants).
130
 And interestingly, 
 
 
 121. See Glenn Setzer, Second Life Businesses Can Rake in Some Surprising Profits and 
Participants, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (May 16, 2007, 7:00 AM), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily. 
com//5162007_Second_Life_Real_Estate.asp [https://perma.cc/6VXB-VN9K]. 
 122. See Buying Land, SECOND LIFE, https://community.secondlife.com/t5/English-Knowledge-
Base/Buying-land/ta-p/700043 [https://perma.cc/9H2Q-4E94] (last visited May 30, 2015). 
 123. One can either rent land from other users, in the case of private island estates, or one can rent 
mainland directly from Linden Labs. Id. (“Instead of buying land, you can rent land . . . .”). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 126, 127–
28 (2009) (“A tenant seised of land had sworn homage to the lord from whom he held. In exchange, 
the lord symbolically delivered the tenant into possession. Thereafter, the tenant owed the lord various 
services and feudal incidents, and in return the lord was obliged to defend his possession against 
outsiders to the relationship. Every element of this system maps cleanly onto Second Life. A user 
swears homage by clicking “I agree” to Linden's terms and conditions; Linden delivers her into 
possession by changing an appropriate database entry. She owes tier fees in place of feudal incidents; 
Linden defends her possession via software-based access controls.”); see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK 
& FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 
66–69 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2d ed. 2010) (1898) (describing the English feudal system of land tenures); 
S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976) (further explaining the 
common law land system). 
 130. See Grimmelmann, supra note 129, at 127–28. 
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the economic substance of the feudal hierarchy is somewhat mirrored in 
the Second Life estates system.
131
 Linden Labs generates a substantial 
profit through their real estate program, and some of the larger real estate 
holding users have become incredibly wealthy, in real life dollars, through 
the management of these virtual land assets.
132
 One individual in 
particular, Anshe Chung, began “purchasing” land in Second Life in the 
early stages of the program’s development and has become “the first video 
game player on the planet to become a millionaire by buying and selling 
virtual real estate.”133  
And many more users have come to use their Second Life real estate 
assets to supplement, or even serve as the primary source of, household 
income.
134
 One man left a thirteen-year long job in 2009 at Merrill Lynch 
to devote all his work time to Second Life real estate development.
135
 He 
pays Linden Labs $295 monthly for an island estate, which he subdivides 
into 16 distinct parcels (about $17 a piece).
136
 He then rents out these 
individual parcels for between $24-25 dollars, making roughly over $100 
profit for each island.
137
 With over 150 islands, the income generated from 
this virtual real estate empire is significant.
138
 He reports that he makes 
slightly less than his former salary of over $70,000.
139
 Moreover, he and 
 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Glenn Setzer, Is Virtual Real Estate More Than An Oxymoron?, MORTGAGE NEWS 
DAILY (May 15, 2007, 7:00AM), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/5152007_Virtual_ Real_ 
Estate.asp [https://perma.cc/J2V9-PZB6]; Benjamin Genocchio, Flying Avatars Admire the Artwork, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/arts/artsspecial/ 12second.html; 
Bruce Sterling, The Second Life Real-Estate Bubble Is Holding Just Fine, Thanks, WIRED (Mar. 8, 
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/03/the-second-life-real-estate-bubble-is-holding-just-
fine-thanks/ [https://perma.cc/NNL6-HDT6]. 
 133. See Kruege, Second Life: Cashing in on Virtual Real Estate, G2G BLOG (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://www.g2g.com/blog/second-life-cashing-in-on-virtual-real-estate/ [https://perma.cc/L9R2-EGEN]. 
For a look at Anshe Chung’s total virtual asset portfolio, see http://anshechung.com 
[https://perma.cc/94YK-DTER]. 
 134. See Michael S. Rosenwald, Second Life's Virtual Money Can Become Real-Life Cash, 
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/03/07/AR2010030703524.html (“As in physical reality, these land barons are few in number but 
generate a big chunk of the world's gross domestic product. The top 25 Second Life earners are mostly 
land barons, making a combined $12 million.”); Rob Hof, Second Life's First Millionaire, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 26, 2006, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-
11-25/second-lifes-first-millionaire; Setzer, supra note 121.  
 135. Second Life's Real Estate Barons, CNNMONEY (Mar. 17, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/ 
video/news/2010/03/17/n_real_estates_second_life.cnnmoney/. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. 
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his business partner provide 24-hour client support, and employ a number 
of other users as sales agents and administrative support specialists.
140
  
But, it is not just individual users who have plunged into the virtual real 
estate market. A number of well-known businesses have also invested in 
the Second Life land game. For instance, H&R Block rents land and 
opened a branch office in Second Life.
141
 In fact, “[r]eal-life tax 
professionals in avatar form were available to answer questions for free 
during tax preparation season and Block was offering Second Life 
residents an opportunity to buy Tango[,] its new tax software[,] for $100 
Linden Dollars. Off line it sells for $70.”142 Coldwell Banker, one of the 
largest real estate brokerage companies in the U.S., is also engaged in the 
selling of land and homes in Second Life.
143
 Even academic institutions—
such as the University of California-Davis, the Harvard Law School, and 
others
144—have come to integrate virtual worlds into their curriculum.145  
With such a broad scope of participants and such a substantial amount 
of money changing hands, virtual world accounts like those on Second 
Life are far more than mere video games. Rather, they comprise very real 
and economically significant digital assets.  
3.  Social Media Accounts 
No discussion of virtual property would be complete without 
addressing social media. Social media accounts are, by one definition, 
“web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other 
users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their 
list of connections and those made by others within the system.”146 The 
 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Setzer, supra note 121. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Ashley Phillips, Coldwell Banker Puts Real House on Second Life Block, ABCNEWS (Aug. 
2, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3437446. 
 144. See, e.g., Michael Erard, A Boon to Second Life Language Schools, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 
10, 2007), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/407667/a-boon-to-second-life-language-schools/ 
[https://perma.cc/K456-5YHA]. 
 145. Living a Second Life, supra note 110; see also Grace Wong, Educators Explore 'Second Life' 
Online, CNN (Nov. 14, 2006, 5:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/TECH/11/13/second.life. 
university/; Jessica Shepherd, Universities Discover Second Life, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2007, 4:51 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/may/08/students.elearning. 
 146. Sally Brown Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property in Community Property Regimes: Are 
My Facebook Friends Considered Earnings, Profits, Increases in Value, or Goodwill?, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 717, 755 (2011) (quoting Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, 
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2007)). 
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ability to store a high volume of digital assets and share them across 
limited or vast spectrums is what makes these services particularly 
attractive.
147
 By one account, the total number of social media users is 
expected to reach over 2.34 billion by the end of 2016.
148
 
Facebook is by far the most well known and most successful of all the 
social media platforms
149—although Myspace came before it, Facebook 
has certainly defined what it means to live in the social media age.
150
 
Through Facebook, individuals create online profiles for both commercial 
and consumer purposes.
151
 The platform allows users to send messages, 
upload files, share, and sometimes edit the posts of others, and generally 
distribute news and information across a robust, multi-faceted network.
152
 
As of November 2016, Facebook has over 1.7 billion active monthly 
users.
153
 Facebook made its first public offering in 2012 with an initial 
market capitalization of $104 billion, and as of November 2016, Facebook 
reached a market capitalization of $371 billion.
154
 
 
 
 147. See Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: 
Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185 (2012). 
 148. See Number of Social Network Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2020 (in Billions), STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/F564-UWTL] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
 149. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
legal/terms [https://perma.cc/2BNQ-TEGQ] (last visited May 31, 2015). 
 150. See Adam Hartung, How Facebook Beat MySpace, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2011, 12:36 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2011/01/14/why-facebook-beat-myspace/ 
[https://perma.cc/PK3T-5DUG]; Henry Blodget, The 13 Secrets To Facebook's Success, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (May 17, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/secrets-to-facebooks-success-
2012-5; Miguel Helft, Facebook Makes Headway Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/technology/companies/08facebook.html; Mark Scott, As 
Facebook Sweeps Across Europe, Regulators Gird for Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/technology/as-facebook-sweeps -across-europe-regulators-gird-
for-battle.html. 
 151. See Sherry, supra note 147, at 199. 
 152. Id. at 199–200. One popular feature that Facebook offers is the ability to upload and share 
live streaming videos. These videos proved to be a tremendous resource during the attempted coup 
d’état in Turkey during summer 2016. See Jonathan Vanian, The Coup Attempt in Turkey Will Be 
Livestreamed, FORTUNE (July 15, 2016, 8:44 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/07/15/turkish-military-
coup-facebook-live-twitter-periscope/ (“Television and cable news networks have traditionally 
broadcast live video of previous coups, such as the military uprising against Libyan Prime Minister Ali 
Zeidan in 2013, along with various wars like those in Iraq. But the advent of two popular live video 
streaming services like Facebook Live and Twitter’s Periscope service have made it possible for 
people to film and share in real time the chaotic scenes of military roughing up citizens and people 
climbing on tanks.”). 
 153. Facebook Statistics and Facts (Nov. 2016), DMR, http://expandedramblings.com/ 
index.php/by-the-numbers-17-amazing-facebook-stats/ [https://perma.cc/BKW9-CBKB] (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2016). 
 154. Facebook Market Cap, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/FB/market_cap (log in to 
YCharts account, search for time period including Nov. 1, 2016 on the above link) (last visited Nov. 
10, 2016). 
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A similar social media platform is LinkedIn.
155
 It represents the 
“world’s largest professional network on the Internet”156 and is often 
called “Facebook for Business.”157 Through its platform individuals create 
their own business/employee profiles and then make “connections” 
between themselves and others, usually with the aim of creating or 
solidifying business relationships.
158
 The platform serves a number of 
other functions as well. It can help individuals find jobs and employment 
and can assist employers in evaluating potential job candidates.
159
 The 
company was launched in May 2003, and a year later had roughly 175 
million members.
160
 As of September 2016, the company reports a total of 
450 million users spanning across the globe,
161
 adding two new users per 
second.
162
 In early 2011, the company went public and shortly thereafter 
achieved a market value of 8.8 billion
163
 and by 2016 earned a market 
capitalization of a little over $25 billion.
164
 In 2016 Microsoft acquired 
LinkedIn for $26.6 billion, the largest acquisition in the tech giant’s 
history.
165
  
 
 
 155. User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement [https://perma. 
cc/BZ7M-PJPQ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 156. See Sherry supra, note 147, at 202. 
 157. Erik Qualman, LinkedIn IPO on NYSE (LNKD) $3 Billion Valuation, GOODREADS (May 9, 
2011), https://www.goodreads.com/author_blog_posts/1190553-linkedin-ipo-on-nyse-lnkd-3-billion-
valuation. 
 158. Help Center, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin.com/app/home [https://perma.cc/SAZ3-6VYG] 
(last visited May 26, 2015). 
 159. See Rebekah Campbell, Why I Do All My Recruiting Through LinkedIn, N.Y. TIMES: YOU’RE 
THE BOSS (Aug. 19, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/why-i-do-all-of-my-
recruiting-through-linkedin/; Leslie Kaufman, LinkedIn Builds Its Publishing Presence, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jun. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/technology/sharing-business-insights-linkedin-
builds-its-publishing-presence.html.  
 160. See Sherry supra, note 147, at 202. 
 161. Statistics and Facts About LinkedIn, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/topics/951/linkedin/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7SA-WLWT] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016). 
 162. Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 133 Amazing LinkedIn Statistics, DMR, http://expanded 
ramblings.com/index.php/by-the-numbers-a-few-important-linkedin-stats/ [https://perma.cc/XFD7-38LB] 
(last visited May 26, 2015). 
 163. Ari Levy & Lee Spears, LinkedIn Retains Most Gains Second Day After Surging in IPO, 
BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-
18/linkedin-raises-352-8-million-in-ipo-as-shares-priced-at-top-end-of-range. 
 164. LinkedIn Market Cap, Y-CHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/LNKD/market_cap 
[https://perma.cc/FJ6J-XR7F] (log in to Y-Charts account, then search for date Sept. 22, 2016 at the 
link above) (last visited September 22, 2016). 
 165. Jay Greene, Microsoft to Acquire LinkedIn for $26.2 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 14, 2016, 
12:58 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-to-acquire-linkedin-in-deal-valued-at-26-2-billion-
1465821523. 
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Yet another social media platform worthy of mention is Twitter.
166
 
Essentially, Twitter creates a space for small-scale blogging whereby the 
user posts—or “tweets”—messages (limited to 140-characters), uploads 
videos and images, and shares the posts of others along a continuously 
updating feed.
167
 The company itself was created in 2006 and raised about 
$200 million through a venture capital offering in 2010,
168
 then it went 
public in November 2013.
169
 As of November 2016, Twitter had a market 
capitalization of $12.5 billion,
170
 and in September 2016 Twitter has over 
342 million active users.
171
 Moreover, this is a wildly popular form of 
microblogging and instant communication, particularly for celebrities. 
Lady Gaga, for instance, was the most followed person on Twitter as of 
September 2013; in fact, with thirty-three million followers at the time, 
she was “gain[ing] followers faster than Twitter adds new accounts.”172 
Moreover, Twitter’s influence even extends to financial markets, as shown 
from a 2013 tweet by hedge fund manager Carl C. Icahn regarding his 
eagerness to purchase Apple stock, which resulted one hour later in a jump 
in Apple’s market capitalization by nearly $17 billion.173  
While perhaps not as obvious as with URLs and virtual world assets, 
simple aspects of social media accounts such as the number of “likes” one 
has on Facebook have been found to have tremendous value.
174
 For 
instance, the court in In re CTLI, LLC ordered an insolvent business owner 
to transfer the user name and password of the Twitter account he used to 
promote his business to the reorganized company, comparing the 
 
 
 166. Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en [https://perma.cc/RHT9-HWTM] 
(last visited May 31, 2015). 
 167. See Julia Angwin, How to Twitter, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2009, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123638550095558381. 
 168. See Alexei Oreskovic, Twitter Financing Values Company at $3.7 Billion, REUTERS (Dec. 
15, 2010, 5:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-idUSTRE6BE67M20101215 
[http://perma.cc/P77V-53TC]; see also Mark Milian, Twitter Gets $35 Million in New Venture Funds, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/14/business/fi-twitter14. 
 169. Victor Luckerson, LIVE UPDATES: Twitter Goes Public, TIME (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/11/07/live-updates-twitter-goes-public/. 
 170. Twitter Market Cap, Y-CHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/TWTR/market_cap (log in to 
Y-Charts account, then search for Nov. 1, 2015 on the link above) (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
 171. See Twitter Statistics, supra note 8. 
 172. Allison Stadd, 50 Twitter Fun Facts, SOCIALTIMES, (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/50-twitter-fun-facts/475073. 
 173. See David Carr, Using Twitter to Move the Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/media/using-twitter-to-move-the-markets.html . 
 174. See Christopher Hopkins, Bankruptcy Court “Right-Swipes” Debtor’s Property Interest in Its 
Social Media Accounts, BANKR. BLOG (Apr. 21, 2015), http://business-finance-restructuring. 
weil.com/property-of-the-estate/bankruptcy-court-right-swipes-debtors-property-interest-in-its-social-
media-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/32H3-H5WN] (describing the collateral value of social media 
accounts in bankruptcy proceedings). 
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followers list to a customer list and declaring it part of the bankruptcy 
estate.
175
 
While Facebook and Twitter allow for a limited amount of video 
sharing, the last social media site worthy of mention here—YouTube176—
is built entirety around video sharing.
177
 Individuals can create accounts 
and post a seemingly limitless amount of video content—including 
television shows, music videos, blog clips, tutorials, and home movies—to 
YouTube, or, even without an account, browse an endless library of videos 
on almost any and every topic imaginable.
178
 YouTube has over one 
billion users and, according to the company’s estimates, 300 hours of new 
video are posted to YouTube every minute, with content available in 88 
countries and available in 76 languages.
179
 The company began in 2005, 
and over the course of the next year raised over $11 million in venture 
capital funding.
180
 Then, in 2006, YouTube was purchased for $1.65 
billion by Google, Inc. and has been operating as one of its most 
successful subsidiaries since.
181
 
Importantly for purposes of thinking of YouTube as having collateral 
value, YouTube users can also make money from their accounts by joining 
a program known as YouTube Partners whereby the company “runs 
advertisements across partners' videos or makes them available for rent, 
then gives the ‘majority’ of ad-generated money to the Partners.”182 As 
long as the videos meet certain criteria (i.e., do not contain copyrighted 
music/material or inappropriate content), users can monetize their 
 
 
 175. See In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 366-67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 176. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=US&template=terms 
[https://perma.cc/LM6Y-MYQD] (last visited May 31, 2015). 
 177. See Sherry, supra note 147, at 203. 
 178. See Help Center, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/?hl=en#topic=4355266 (last 
visited May 26, 2015). 
 179. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HX3N-5ZKG] (last visited May 26, 2015); Craig Smith, DMR, 145 Amazing YouTube Statistics (Oct. 
2016) (last visited Dec. 3, 2016), http://expandedramblings.com/ index.php/youtube-statistics/. 
 180. Miguel Helft & Matt Richtel, Venture Firm Shares a YouTube Jackpot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/technology/10payday.html (“Sequoia, which is among the 
most successful venture firms in Silicon Valley, invested a total of $11.5 million in YouTube from 
November 2005 to April 2006. It may be walking away with more than 43 times that amount. Its stake 
in YouTube has been estimated at roughly 30 percent, which would give it a value of $495 million.”). 
 181. See Kevin J. Delaney, Google Looks to Boost Ads with YouTube, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2006, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116039852999986783; Tom Warstall, Google's YouTube 
Ad Revenues May Hit $5.6 Billion in 2013, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2013, 3:50 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/timworstall/2013/12/12/googles-youtube-ad-revenues-may-hit-5-6-billion-in-2013/. 
 182. See Sherry, supra note 147, at 203. 
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YouTube experience, with some users generating significant profits.
183
 For 
instance, the YouTube channel Blogilates, run by fitness instructor Casey 
Ho, has garnered over three hundred ninety million views.
184
 Through her 
channel she sells a number of fitness items such as gym bags and Pilates 
gear.
185
 Through this and the YouTube Partners program, Ho states that 
she earns well over six figures a year in income.
186
 According to a 2014 
report, YouTube is estimated to be worth $40 billion, with a projected $8.9 
billion in advertisement revenue in 2015.
187
 While YouTube is certainly 
the most recognizable, other types of file sharing-centered platforms 
dominate the market, such as DropBox, Instagram, Flickr, and others.
188
 
In conclusion, virtual property takes many forms—everything from 
Facebook accounts, to rights in virtual real estate, to owning one’s own 
dot com—but the one thing they all have in common is that they are 
becoming a source of incredible wealth potential for business financing 
even though the contours of what exactly these assets represent are 
unclear. As such, it is only natural that, being of such value, they too will 
pique the interest of the financial sector as a viable and even desirable 
form of collateral. Indeed, property that commands such a significant 
market demand is precisely the type of asset that the policies behind 
U.C.C. 9 would support securitizing.
189
 And because of this, bitproperty 
has a significant role to play as a source of borrowed capital.  
 
 
 183. See Monetization, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/account_monetization?referrer= 
creator [https://perma.cc/Y538-B8JU] (last visited May 26, 2015). 
 184. See Alan Farnham, More People Getting Rich Off YouTube, ABCNEWS (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/youtube-making-people-rich/story?id=17104798 
[http://perma.cc/K4NA-ADW6] (discussing entrepreneurship via YouTube); see also About 
BLOGILATES (last visited Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/user/blogilates/about. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id.; see also Brian Stelter, YouTube Videos Pull in Real Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/business/media/11youtube.html; Will Wei, Meet The YouTube 
Stars Making $100,000 Plus Per Year, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2010, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/meet-the-richest-independent-youtube-stars-2010-8; Felix Gillette, 
On YouTube, Seven-Figure Views, Six-Figure Paychecks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 23, 
2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-23/on-youtube-seven-figure-
views-six-figure-paychecks; How We're Cashing In On YouTube: Thousands Are Pulling in SIX-
FIGURE Incomes with Home-Made Videos, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 30, 2012, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2196110/THOUSANDS-people-making-SIX-FIGURE-income-
home-YouTube-videos.html. 
 187. See Garett Sloane, YouTube May Be Worth Up to $40 Billion—More Than Twitter, ADWEEK 
(Sept. 3, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/youtube-may-be-worth-40-
billion-more-twitter-159861. 
 188. See generally CARBONITE, INC., SYNCING UP WITH BUSINESS MOBILITY (2015), 
https://www.carbonite.com/globalassets/files-white-papers/carb-sync-share-whitepaper.pdf (describing 
file sharing and the connectivity of mobile devices through emerging IT infrastructure). 
 189. Melissa Bradford Springer, Note, Perfecting a Security Interest in “Electronic Chattel 
Paper” Under Revised Article 9, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 496 (2001) (“Many considered Article 9 ‘to 
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II. CONVENTIONAL LENDING, SECURED CREDIT, AND INTANGIBLE 
COLLATERAL 
Despite the unquestionable value that virtual property commands, the 
issue remains as to whether current law provides an adequate vehicle 
whereby such property can be collateralized. Certainly commercial 
policies and market forces would push for the legal flexibility needed in 
order to make such collateralization happen.
190
 But, then again, the law of 
property has not always kept pace with changing commercial practices.
191
 
Rather, with its rigid rules and its tending toward constancy—combined 
with the unusual, amorphous, and non-traditional nature of virtual assets—
it is difficult to imagine that traditional property law would neatly and 
clearly address these issues.
192
 And this is equally true with regard to 
commercial law when it comes to digital property. Sometimes even the 
sophisticated frameworks of commercial law cannot keep pace with 
changing technological innovations.
193
 The sections that follow explore the 
law that governs the ability to grant a security interest over personal 
property—the law of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code—and 
explain how U.C.C. 9 struggles to deal with the collateralization of 
intangible assets. 
A. U.C.C. 9 and Conventional Lending 
The availability of credit is a cornerstone of any economy.
194
 A robust 
credit system turns the wheels of the market, specifically by allowing 
 
 
be the UCC's most innovative and important contribution.’ Original Article 9 was first amended in 
1972 to accommodate ‘innovations in the structure and uses of secured credit.’ As would be expected, 
during the twenty-eight years since Article 9 was first revised, the secured credit markets have 
experienced marked innovations and growth.”). 
 190. See id. (discussing how innovations in commercial lending served as the impetus for the 
enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 191. See, e.g., Odinet, supra note 34 (describing the struggle by courts in conceptualizing tax 
credits as a form of property-based collateral).  
 192. For a discussion of property law’s historically fixed rules and rigid standards, see Yun-chien 
Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1 (2012); Roderick R.M. Paisley, Real Rights: Practical Problems and Dogmatic 
Rigidity, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 267 (2005); Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property 
Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369 (2013); see also Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 
CONN. L. REV. 647, 682 n.186 (2013) (describing servitude law as being “full of ‘rigid categories, silly 
distinctions, and unreconciled conflicts over basic values”’ (quoting Susan F. French, Servitudes 
Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928 (1988))). 
 193. See Springer, supra note 189 (discussing the evolution of electronic chattel paper as a form 
of collateral). 
 194. Costantino Panayides, The Federal Response to the Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
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businesses to provide a variety of goods and services and by allowing 
consumers to avail themselves of such items.
195
 Lenders, in turn, who 
provide credit, are allowed under the law to take a form of property 
interest called security in assets of the debtor in order to entice the lenders 
to extend credit.
196
 In doing so, creditors are given a mechanism whereby 
they can reduce the risk of being unpaid in the event of a default and, as a 
result, will ostensibly agree to extend a larger volume of credit across the 
economy.
197
 For instance, in the case of automobile credit markets, lenders 
are routinely advancing credit to less than creditworthy borrowers, based 
merely on the lender’s ability to take a security interest in the vehicle 
being purchased.
198
 The same principles operate with virtual businesses, 
particularly in the case of start-up companies with few tangible assets but 
with the potential for large economic gains through bitproperty 
development. 
1. Secured v. Unsecured Credit Generally 
That is not to say that all creditors require collateral in making a 
loan.
199
 Large and established companies—particularly those that are 
publicly traded with a wide range of financial information available to the 
public—with significant assets, cash, and healthy credit histories are often 
advanced funds even without the provision of collateral.
200
 While even 
these debtors can take a financial turn for the worse, creditors generally 
take the position that routine monitoring and reporting requirements are 
sufficient to guard against undue credit risk.
201
  
But without a doubt a large number of majority of borrowers must post 
some form of collateral to secure their obligation to repay any funds 
 
 
L. 13, 13 (2008) (“The United States federal government has always understood that the importance of 
credit is not limited to a purely economic function. As Senator Daniel Webster suggested over 170 
years ago, the urgency for the country to keep afloat its credit system was as much of a concern for 
national security as it was for the economic health of the nation.”). 
 195. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 2–3 (2007). 
 196. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH, 
at xxxi (7th ed. 2012). 
 197. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646 
& n.74 (1997); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1, 5–6 (1997). 
 198. See generally Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto Title Lending, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012) (describing the lending patterns of auto financing companies). 
 199. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 2. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. See also Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, 
Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999). 
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advanced.
202
 Secured loans typically allow the borrower to receive more 
money and more favorable terms.
203
 Usually this comes in the form of 
equipment, real estate, inventory, accounts receivable, or forms of 
instruments or investment property, such as stocks and bonds.
204
 Of these, 
perhaps the most prominent are real estate-related loans whereby the credit 
obligation is secured by a mortgage or related security right over real 
property of the debtor.
205
 In the event the borrower fails to make payments 
or otherwise defaults on his obligations, the creditor may have the 
property seized and sold pursuant to a public or private sale.
206
 In the 
realm of personal property, inventory financing is the most prominent in 
asset-based lending.
207
 Here, Wal-Mart, Best Buy, car dealerships, and 
other retail-related companies will use the proceeds from a loan to acquire 
a significant amount of inventory for sale to their customers. In exchange, 
the companies will grant a security interest in the acquired inventory in 
favor of their creditor to secure the obligation to repay.
208
 This scenario 
plays out in many other business contexts as well.
209
 Indeed, credit 
markets essentially depend upon the law of security rights.
210
 
2. Secured Credit Under U.C.C. Article 9 
As stated by Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the lead drafters of 
U.C.C. 9, “[u]ntil early in the nineteenth century the only security devices 
which were known in our legal system were the mortgage of real property 
and the pledge of chattels. Security interests in personal property which 
remained in the borrower’s possession during the loan period were 
 
 
 202. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 3 (discussing the different types of secured and 
unsecured loans available to borrowers). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2009) (describing the anatomy of a financed real 
estate transaction). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 3; see also Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money 
Inventory Financing: The Case for Limited Cross-Collateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1303 
(1990). 
 208. See generally Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jackson, 47 So.3d 558 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Homer 
Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 74 BANKING L.J. 1013 (1957); Michael Allen Birrer, 
Note, The Priority Battle Over Returned and Repossessed Goods: Inventory Financers Versus Chattel 
Paper Financers, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1101 (1991). 
 209. Mann, Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, supra note 197, at 11–18; see also Lynn 
M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1996). 
 210. See generally WARREN & WALT, supra note 195 (describing the importance of secured 
lending in credit markets in a host of contexts). 
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unknown.”211 The borrower was always dispossessed of the property, 
which usually made the production of income impossible.
212
 Later in the 
1880s, two legal devices developed that allowed a limited way in which a 
creditor could obtain a non-possessory interest in the personal property of 
the debtor—these devices consisted of the conditional sale and the chattel 
mortgage.
213
 However, both were problematic, confined to fairly simplistic 
transactions, and ineffective for more dynamic forms of property such as 
inventory or accounts receivable.
214
 Later institutions arose—such as 
assignments of accounts, factoring liens, and trust receipts—to deal with 
these difficulties, but the rules governing them became complex and 
varied widely from state to state.
215
 In essence, the law of secured 
transactions in personal property was imperfect, overly complex, and often 
economically limited.
216
 
Starting in 1962, scholars and practitioners under the aegis of the 
Uniform Law Commission and the American Law Institute came together 
to produce a new unified statutory framework, significantly updated in 
1999, that would simplify and replace the then-existing patchwork scheme 
of security devices so as to produce one clear, flexible, and modernized 
system for collateralizing personal property of any type.
217
 This new 
system included a series of special rules that were triggered depending 
upon the type of property being sought as collateral.
218
 It was called 
Article 9 of the U.C.C., and by many accounts, “Article 9, with its unitary 
concept, revolutionized the American law of secured transactions in 
personal property, and its success has influenced the law of Canada and 
other nations.”219  
 
 
 211. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 24 (1965). 
 212. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 18. 
 213. Id. at 18; see also Thor W. Kolle, Jr., Commercial Credit Law Letter, 73 BANKING L.J. 366, 
366 (1956); see also Note, The Distinction Between the Conditional Sale and a Chattel Mortgage, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 740 (1923) (“if the contract gives a right of action upon the debt without passing title to 
the buyer, and if the debt is not extinguished by enforcing the security, the courts construe the 
agreement a chattel mortgage. On the side of the seller's duties, since one reclaiming goods under a 
chattel mortgage must sell at a foreclosure, and apply the proceeds, an agreement so providing is 
treated as a chattel mortgage. But an agreement imposing no such duty is looked upon as a conditional 
sale.”). 
 214. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 18. 
 215. Id. at 18–19. 
 216. See id.; see also Jason J. Kilborn, Note, Securing Russia’s Future: A Plea for Reform in 
Russian Secured Transactions Law, 95 MICH. L. REV. 255 (1996) (describing the slow progress made 
by Russia law in dealing with security in personal property). 
 217. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 19–20. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id. at 20.; see also Margit Livingston, Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in 
Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1994) (discussing 
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Broadly speaking, granting a security interest under U.C.C. 9 consists 
of a two-step process.
220
 First, the security interest must become effective 
as between the creditor and the debtor. This process is called “attachment” 
and usually, although not always, requires the execution of a document 
setting forth the basic terms of the transactions, known as a security 
agreement.
221
 The second step, known as “perfection,” requires the 
security interest to be made effective against third parties.
222
 Typically this 
is accomplished by filing an abbreviated version of the security 
agreement—called a financing statement—into an official U.C.C. registry 
for that state.
223
 In doing so, the creditor ensures that in the event of a 
default by the debtor, it will be able to avail itself of the equity in the 
collateral in order to recoup its loss ahead of other competing creditors.
224
 
B. Security in General Intangible Property 
The principal drafters of U.C.C. 9, specifically those involved in the 
1999 revision, recognized the ever-evolving need to expand the scope of 
the law of secured credit to meet the changing needs and desires of parties 
to commercial and consumer transactions.
225
 Without a wide-ranging and 
robust framework, U.C.C. 9 could over time become as uncertain and 
cumbersome as were the former rules.
226
  
To that end, the drafters created a number of collateral-specific 
categories, ranging from equipment and inventory to instruments and 
investment property.
227
 In most cases, parties use these broad categories to 
describe the collateral rather than overly detailing the particulars of the 
 
 
the benefits of the Article 9 system); Nimmer, supra note 36 (discussing advances in Article 9 to deal 
with intellectual property collateral); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Scholarship on Revised Article 9, 55 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 168 (2001) (listing scholarly research and commentary on UCC 9’s 1999 
revision). 
 220. 8 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UCC SERIES § 9-101:1 (2016) (giving an overview of UCC 
article 9). 
 221. See id. §§ 9-201 to 9-208. 
 222. See id. §§ 9-301 to 9-318. 
 223. See id. §§ 9-401 to 9-408. 
 224. See id. §§ 9-501 to 9-507 (describing the remedies upon default). 
 225. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 20. 
 226. See id.; see also Stephen L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of 
Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994). 
 227. See Odinet, supra note 34, at 154–55; see also LESTER E. DENONN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
UNDER THE UCC 36-38 (rev. ed. 1965). 
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property in question.
228
 The category with which this Article is most 
concerned is that of “general intangibles.”229  
Despite the great deal of specificity that U.C.C. 9 accords the various 
other categories, the definition of general intangibles is left quite open-
ended.
230
 Section 9-102(a)(42) states that this category consists of “any 
personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel 
paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, 
instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, 
money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term includes 
payment intangibles and software.”231 In essence, the definition is residual 
and is meant to form a net into which collateral excluded from the other 
U.C.C. 9 categories may be caught.
232
 
As the definition and the comments thereto bear out, U.C.C. 9 states 
that general intangibles include intellectual property as well as software.
233
 
Both are important in the context of understanding the collateralization of 
virtual property due to the fact that many forms or aspects of virtual 
property involve intellectual property rights (although there is great 
divergence among lawyers and commentators as to when rights are and are 
not intellectual property-related).
234
 First, as a broad matter the way in 
which all general intangibles are collateralized (both for attachment and 
perfection) is fairly uniform.
235
 The debtor, through the security 
agreement, grants an interest to the creditor in his general intangibles, and 
then the creditor files a financing statement describing the same in the 
U.C.C. records of the jurisdiction.
236
 From U.C.C. 9’s perspective, nothing 
else need be done.
237
 However, the process is not quite as simple as the 
 
 
 228. But see Terry M. Anderson, Marianne B. Culhane & Catherine Lee Wilson, Attachment and 
Perfection of Security Interests Under Revised Article 9: A “Nuts and Bolts” Primer, 9 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 179, 187 (2001) (“Whatever record the debtor adopts must contain a description of the 
collateral . . . [S]uper-generic descriptions like ‘all personal property’ will not be sufficient for security 
agreements.”). 
 229. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2014). 
 230. See Odinet, supra note 34, at 154 (footnote omitted) (“This category was added last in the list 
of Article 9 collateral classes as a catch-all provision. Anything that does not fall under one of the 
other categories can, in most cases, be classified as a general intangible.”). 
 231. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). 
 232. See Odinet, supra note 34, at 154. 
 233. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) . 
 234. See JAMES CHARLES SMITH, EDWARD J. LARSON, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JOHN A. 
KIDWELL, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 233 (3d ed. 2013). 
 235. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 363. 
 236. See id. 
 237. Id.  
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law of secured transactions suggests.
238
 Rather, the existence of a number 
of other laws—mostly federal—complicates the collateralization 
process.
239
 Indeed, a number of secured transactions scholars have noted 
that these federal statutes were drafted without a thought given to how 
they might need to work in tandem with state law.
240
 It is partly for this 
reason, in fact, that the ability to collateralize (or more specifically, to 
perfect a security interest in) bitproperty is so uncertain. The following 
sections briefly describe the process of collateralizing intellectual property 
under U.C.C. 9, pointing out the difficulties that arise in these transactions 
and the uneasy relationship between federal and state law in this arena. In 
doing so, this discussion points out the fractured and inconsistent ways in 
which U.C.C. 9 deals with general intangibles, and by extension more 
complex forms of intangible property like virtual assets. 
1. Tensions in Copyright Law 
Copyrights, trademarks, and patents most prominently occupy the field 
of intellectual property.
241
 However, despite the incredible value attached 
to these assets in today’s economy, the law governing their 
collateralization remains incredibly confusing and somewhat uncertain—
both for practitioners and courts.
242
 A host of scholars have called for a 
reformation of the process of using intellectual property as security, 
generally to no avail.
243
 An understanding of how courts deal with these 
issues is instructive in grasping the place of virtual property in the secured 
credit world. 
Copyrights consist broadly of original works of authorship “fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.”244 Importantly, copyrighted material 
need not be registered in order for it to be accorded the protections of 
copyright law.
245
 Indeed, a great many copyrights are unregistered—
 
 
 238. See id.  
 239. See id.  
 240. See id. at 363–64. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012) (federal trademark law); 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012) (federal copyright law); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–329 (2012) (federal patent law). 
 241. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Financing Information Technologies: Fairness and Function, 2001 
WIS. L. REV. 1067, 1074. 
 242. See id. at 1093–1104. 
 243. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 364 (citing Shawn K. Baldwin, Comment, “To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts”: A Role for Federal Regulation of Intellectual 
Property as Collateral, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1701 (1995); Patrick R. Barry, Note, Software Copyrights 
as Loan Collateral: Evaluating the Reform Proposals, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 581 (1995)). 
 244. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 245. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 364. 
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ranging from student research papers to amateur artwork.
246
 However, in 
order to seek recourse against an infringer under certain laws a copyright 
must be registered with the United States Copyright Office housed within 
the Library of Congress.
247
 But unfortunately the provisions of federal law 
and U.C.C. 9 state law have not always acted in harmony with one 
another. For instance, in the bankruptcy appeals case of In re Peregrine 
Entertainment, a California district court was confronted with whether the 
filing and perfection provisions found in U.C.C. 9 acted as an alternative 
to the federal Copyright Act’s filing provisions, alongside the federal act, 
or were preempted by the federal law.
248
 The court held that because “[t]he 
availability of parallel state recordation systems that could put parties on 
constructive notice as to encumbrances on copyrights would surely 
interfere with the effectiveness of the federal recordation scheme. . .” the 
U.C.C. 9 filing system for intellectual property is “preempted by the 
Copyright Act.”249  
This ruling, of course, can only apply to copyrights that are federally 
registered. For unregistered copyrights the Copyright Act does not provide 
a recordation scheme, thus the court in In re World Auxiliary Power 
Company held that U.C.C. 9 governs the filing process for these types of 
works.
250
 A number of practical and unresolved issues arise in the gap 
between the two. For instance, what happens if a creditor perfects a 
security interest in an unregistered copyright under U.C.C. 9, and then, 
once the copyright is later registered, another creditor perfects a security 
interest in the registered copyright under the Copyright Act?
251
 Which 
security interest prevails? Does the former’s interest become unperfected 
upon federal registration? If the first creditor perfects under the federal 
scheme after registration takes place does its priority rank back to the 
state-level perfection? What is the status of the second creditor who 
perfected under the Copyright Act immediately after registration? The law 
provides no answers to these important questions and this has resulted in 
 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (providing priority to registered transfers of a copyright); see also 
Copyright Registration and Enforcement, STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES (last visited Dec. 3, 
2016), http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/faqs/registration-and-enforcement/ (“You must register 
your copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office before you are legally permitted to bring a lawsuit to 
enforce it.”). 
 248. Nat’l Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd.), 116 
B.R. 194, 201 (C.D. Cal. 1990).  
 249. See In re Peregrine Entm’t 116 B.R. at 201–02.  
 250. Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxillary Power Co.), 303 F.3d 
1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002);. 
 251. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 387. 
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many individuals being forced to register in multiple places and conduct 
searches under both systems (a process that can be both time-consuming 
and expensive).
252
  
2. Tensions in Trademark Law 
Trademark secured transactions also raise a number of issues. A 
trademark is “a distinctive mark, symbol, or emblem used by a producer or 
manufacturer to identify and distinguish that person’s products from those 
of others.”253 One acquires a trademark under common law rules by simple 
application and use, but there are good reasons to also register one’s 
trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office housed within the 
Department of Commerce, as well as with the applicable agency in one’s 
home state.
254
 Using trademarks as a form of collateral, however, is a 
wholly different matter. Although the federal trademark statute, the 
Lanham Act,
255
 speaks to the assignability of registered trademarks as 
being a matter of federal law, it does not speak to the issue of security 
interests directly, as does the Copyright Act.
256
 Under these facts then, one 
might think that transactions involving security rights in trademarks do not 
raise federal questions. 
However, despite the similarities between copyrights and trademarks, 
the treatment of each in the context of the granting of a security interest is 
markedly (and most commentators would say insanely) different.
257
 For 
instance, the court in In re Together Development Corp. addressed 
whether a registered trademark could be collateralized under U.C.C. 9’s 
state law provisions, or whether a federal recordation scheme governed.
258
 
The court was persuaded that, because the history of the Lanham Act 
seemed to be geared toward dealing with sales of businesses (and their 
 
 
 252. See id. at 387.  
 253. See id. at 388 (citing Educ. Dev. Corp. v. Econ. Co., 562 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977)). 
 254. Id. at 388. For instance, registering a trademark with the federal government allows the 
holder of the mark to file a trademark infringement lawsuit in federal court for, among other things, 
damages and other monetary remedies. See generally GLYNN LUNNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TRADEMARK LAW (2010). 
 255. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012). 
 256. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 388; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1060. 
 257. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 392 (citing Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: 
Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645 (1996); 
GILMORE, supra note 211, at 401. 
 258. In re Together Development Corp., 227 B.R. 439, 440 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998). 
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accompanying trademarks)
259
 and because Congress specifically addressed 
assignments and security interests in cousin-statutes, such as the 
Copyright Act,
260
 but only assignments in the Lanham Act, recordation of 
a trademark security interest in the U.S. Trademark and Patent Office was 
not necessary.
261
 Rather, one could simply perfect a security interest in a 
trademark under state U.C.C. 9 schemes.
262
 In other words, registration or 
non-registration need not play a role. A host of other courts have taken this 
view as well, most lamenting the undesirable and inconsistent state of the 
law between copyrights and trademarks along the way.
263
 Indeed, in many 
contexts the ability to assign one’s rights is a prerequisite to granting a 
security interest at all.
264
 Furthermore, many types of security instruments 
are denominated as “collateral assignments,” particularly when dealing 
with intangible rights such as revenue or income streams.
265
 Why the 
vernacular of commercial and property law failed to persuade the courts in 
their interpretation of the Latham Act and collateralizing trademarks 
remains a mystery. 
3. Tensions in Patent Law 
While trademarks can only be collateralized by filing under U.C.C. 9, 
registered copyrights can only be collateralized by filing under federal 
 
 
 259. Id. at 441 (“First, its reference to the ‘successor to the business’ suggests Congress had in 
mind an outright assignment in the context of the sale of an entire business of which the trademark is a 
part.”). 
 260. Id. (“Congress has expressly included consensual liens in the copyright recording system, 
thereby demonstrating its awareness of the possibility of such liens and its inclination to make 
manifest an intention to require their recording when that intention is present.”). 
 261. See id. at 441–42. 
 262. Id. at 442. 
 263. See Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778, 781–82 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1992); In re Chattanooga Choo–Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re C.C. & 
Co., 86 B.R. 485, 486–87 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat’l Acceptance Co. of 
Am. (In re Roman Cleaner Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 944 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d 802 F.2d 207 (6th 
Cir. 1986); Creditors' Comm. of TR-3 Indus., Inc. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Indus.), 41 B.R. 128, 
131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984). 
 264. Because the granting of a security interests is to transfer an interest in the property itself to 
the creditor, the able to “assign” rights in the property is essential. See ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
CREDITORS § 1 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. Law Publishers rev. 6th ed. 1894) (“An assignment 
is a transfer or setting over of property, or of some right or interest therein, from one person to 
another. . .”); see also Assignment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining assignment 
as “[t]he transfer of rights or property”). 
 265. See 3 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & DAVID OLIVERI, COMMERCIAL ASSET-BASED FINANCING 
§ 22:39 (2016); 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, LAW OF REAL 
ESTATE FINANCING § 18:15 (2016); see also Collateral Assignment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (“An assignment of property as collateral security for a loan.”). 
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law, and unregistered copyrights can only be collateralized by filing under 
U.C.C. 9, the situation for collateralizing patents presents yet another 
complexity. A patent is “[t]he right to exclude others from making, using, 
marketing, selling, offering for sale, or importing an invention for a 
specified period (20 years from the date of filing), granted by the federal 
government to the inventor if the device or process is novel, useful, and 
nonobvious.”266  
The court in In re Cybernetic Services, Inc. was confronted with the 
question of whether a secured creditor must file his financing statement 
under state U.C.C. 9 in order to perfect a security interest in his debtor’s 
patent or else perfect at the federal level.
267
 Importantly, the U.S. Patent 
Act provides that “[a]n assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as 
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable 
consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and 
Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of 
such subsequent purchase or mortgage.”268 Again, the word assignment is 
used, as well as other words indicating that any kind of transfer of a 
property interest in a patent implicates the Patent Act (the word 
assignment would, under any property regime, include the granting of an 
encumbrance).
269
 Surprisingly, however, the court held that the language 
in the federal statute describing “grants” and “conveyances” was meant to 
only include transfers of ownership, but not the granting of encumbrances, 
and also shockingly held that the use of the term “mortgagee” used later in 
the same sentence was meant only to deal with those who acquired 
ownership, curiously based on the title-theory of mortgages combined 
with a perplexing discussion of the absence of the terms “pledge” or “lien” 
in the Patent Act.
270
 Thus, perfection of a security interest in a patent must 
take place under state U.C.C. 9 procedures, even though the statute itself 
seems to clearly embrace any and all types of transfers of property 
interests in patents from one party to another.
271
 
 
 
 266. Patent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added); see also 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–103. 
 267. Moldo v. Mastco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 268. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).  
 269. Encumbrance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(32) (AM. LAW 
INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014) (“‘Encumbrance’ means a right, other 
than an ownership interest, in real property. The term includes mortgages and other liens on real 
property.”). 
 270. See In re Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1053–55. 
 271. See id. at 1048–1057. 
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This case and others like it have caused uncertainty in the realm of 
security in patents.
272
 For instance, the question of what happens when 
patent ownership and the granting of a security interest are intertwined 
remains open.
273
 As Professors Walt and Warren describe in their seminal 
text, the temporal ordering of a debtor’s transfer of ownership of a patent 
to a third party, a creditor’s perfection of a security interest in the patent 
under U.C.C. 9, and the recording of the assignment documentation in the 
Patent Office raise a host of issues as to effectiveness and priority of 
claims—none of which are addressed by the court, U.C.C. 9, or federal 
law.
274
 
The cases and discussion above regarding intellectual property 
collateral more than exemplify the poor state of the law in this area. As the 
noted commercial law scholar Professor Ronald Mann so appropriately 
expressed, the perfection system for certain intangible assets “is so ill-
suited to modern commercial lending transactions that even well-
counseled lenders on substantial transactions often find that it is not cost 
effective to comply with the system sufficiently to obtain a perfected 
security interest in their collateral.”275 Indeed, under such a fractured and 
confusing system, it is no surprise that the use of bitproperty in secured 
transactions is not legally certain 
III. FAILURES AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS FOR BITPROPERTY COLLATERAL 
As noted above, in the context of intellectual property, U.C.C. 9 
provides a weak and often confusing framework for the collateralization of 
virtual assets. Indeed, many aspects of more conventional intellectual 
property such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks are the subject of 
conflicting case law and scholarly views. Moreover, the ways in which 
state U.C.C. 9 law interacts with applicable federal law relative to each 
type of intellectual property asset is far from coherent or consistent.
276
 
Sometimes U.C.C. 9 is displaced by federal law and at other times federal 
law takes a backseat to state law recordation entirely. And frequently the 
 
 
 272. See Pasteurized Eggs Corp. v. Bon Dente Joint Venture (In re Pasteurized Eggs Corp.), 296 
B.R. 283 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2003); Ariel Glasner, Making Something Out of “Nothing”: The Trend 
Towards Securitizing Intellectual Property Assets and the Legal Obstacles that Remain, 3 J. LEGAL 
TECH. RISK MGMT. 27, 27–29, 49–50 (2008). 
 273. WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 401–02. 
 274. See id. 
 275. Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 153 
(1999).  
 276. See supra Section II.B. 
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rationale for the disparate treatment is hinged upon nuances that appear 
contrary to what the applicable statutory language would suggest and 
inconsistent with the goals of coherence, simplicity, and reducing 
transactions costs that are at the heart of commercial law generally. 
A. Critique of U.C.C. 9’s One-Size-Fits-All Approach to General 
Intangibles 
With that intellectual property background in mind, the following 
sections set forth U.C.C. 9’s major structural weaknesses when it comes to 
specifically collateralizing virtual property in the context of general 
intangibles, including how these weaknesses have led to judicial confusion 
in the conceptualization of general intangibles more broadly. Because the 
drafters of U.C.C. 9 sought to create a unitary system for the 
collateralization of personal property—indeed, the beauty of the Article 9 
system was that it replaced the otherwise patchwork quilt of state laws on 
security in personal property—the law envisions that all general 
intangibles share common attributes, or at the very least do not merit 
different treatment.
277
 However, this is far from the truth. A number of 
assets, and particularly virtual property assets, are derived from the 
combination of a series of legal institutions and doctrines that do not lend 
themselves well to unitary treatment as merely a “general intangible.”278 
This is particularly true since virtual property can be comprised of both IP 
and non-IP related rights. And, as explained below, the many diverse parts 
that comprise bitproperty’s identity make U.C.C. 9’s general intangible 
framework less than optimal.
279
 
1. Jurisprudential Confusion in Valuation 
This first problem is one that lies at the heart of the virtual property 
conundrum. Courts have difficulty understanding and conceptualizing 
intangible assets generally as a form of property and thus place them 
 
 
 277. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 195, at 18–21; see also Odinet, supra note 34, at 173–74 
(discussing the problem of collateralizing other types of general intangibles, specifically tax credits, 
under Article 9’s unified scheme). 
 278. See Krisko, supra note 28, at 1182 (“Case law descriptions of domain name rights will thus 
determine both the ability of these rights to serve as collateral and their collateral categorization under 
Revised Article 9.”). 
 279. See Cohen & Laue, supra note 28, at 428 (“Domain names have been characterized as a 
combination of ‘trademark, address and telephone number.’ While this might be a handy analogy, it 
says little about the nature of the property rights embodied in a domain name.” (quoting Chase, supra 
note 29)). 
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within the constellation of rights afforded to persons under property law—
prominently of which includes the right to encumber.
280
 Although, as 
discussed above, a number of courts have recognized that many intangible 
assets, including virtual assets, have real value and should be accorded the 
mantle of rights that come along with being classified as property, a 
number of other courts have not been as eager to make such a finding. 
For instance, in terms of general intangible rights more broadly, courts 
have been extremely mixed on whether to recognize that items such as tax 
credits should be regarded as a form of property and thus made available 
for collateralization under U.C.C. 9. In Chicago v. Michigan Beach 
Housing Cooperative, the Illinois Court of Appeals was one of the first 
courts to address tax credits in secured transactions, and was faced with 
whether $780,000 in federal low-income housing tax credits could be 
collateralized as a general intangible under U.C.C. 9.
281
 The court held that 
“income tax credits cannot be intangible personal property subject to a 
security interest under Article 9.”282 While the court noted that “no court 
has yet determined whether income tax credits constitute general 
intangibles for purposes of Article 9” the tax benefits derived from tax 
dedications and tax credits “have no value in themselves.”283 In support of 
its rationale, the court stated that “the economic benefit to the investor—
the true ‘tax benefit’—arises because the investor may offset tax 
deductions against income received from other sources or use tax credits 
to reduce the taxes otherwise payable on account of such income.”284 The 
court made the distinction between what it deemed to be property with real 
value—such as tax refunds, which constitute a right to receive a payment 
from the government—with property whose value is only derived from the 
ability to otherwise reduce monetary obligations due in the form of tax 
liability—like non-refundable tax credits.285 The court declared, “[T]ax 
credits do not constitute a right to a payment of money, have no 
independent value, and are not freely transferable upon receipt.”286 
The court’s ruling in the Michigan Beach Cooperative case is 
emblematic of a trend of judicial difficulty in conceptualizing intangible 
property rights. Contrary to what the court held, tax credits are quite 
 
 
 280. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112–24 (Guest ed., 
1961) (discussing the central pillars of ownership of property). 
 281. 609 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 282. Id. at 885. 
 283. Id. (quoting Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 657 (1986)).  
 284. Id. (quoting Randall, 478 U.S. at 657). 
 285. Id. at 886. 
 286. Id. 
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valuable and can not only constitute a payment in money, but may also be 
transferred, all depending upon the type of credit.
287
 In fact, some state tax 
credit laws require that the state repurchase the credits upon demand by 
the owner.
288
 Moreover, once a taxpayer’s liability is extinguished, any 
excess credits will often be refunded in the form of cash.
289
 And lastly, 
there is a robust and active market for the buying and selling of 
transferable tax credits for everything from solar installations to the 
reconstruction of historic buildings.
290
  
The court in Michigan Beach Cooperative also made note that credits 
have no “independent value.”291 However, this summation is just not 
true—or at the very least not so simple. Indeed, a host of economic theory 
literature exists explaining the nature of markets and property in the value 
inquiry.
292
 For instance, the intrinsic or labor theory of value states that 
things are deemed to have inherent value based on the particulars of what 
comprises the object and what labor and materials went into bringing the 
thing into being.
293
 As Adam Smith noted, “[t]he real price of every thing, 
what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil 
and trouble of acquiring it.”294 Might we consider that tax credits satisfy 
this definition? On the one hand, they certainly fail in the sense that 
physical labor is not involved because the thing is intangible. But on the 
other hand, a more expansive view would be that a great deal of human 
capital and expense went into, for instance, the housing development that 
ultimately produced the tax credits. Might this be within the contemplation 
of the theory and therefore sufficient to produce the court’s need for 
“independent value”?  
 
 
 287. See Odinet, supra note 34, at 145–47. 
 288. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007(C)(4)(f)(i) (2016) (“Beginning on and after January 1, 
2007, the investor who earned the motion picture investor tax credits may transfer the credits to the 
[office of entertainment industry development in the Department of Economic Development] for 
seventy-two percent of the face value of the credits. Beginning January 1, 2009, and every second year 
thereafter, the percent of the face value of the tax credits allowed for transferring credits to the office 
shall increase two percent until the percentage reaches eighty percent.”). 
 289. Odinet, supra note 34, at 152. 
 290. See id. at 153. 
 291. Mich. Beach Housing, 609 N.E.2d at 886. 
 292. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, ch. 1 (2007) (. . . 
[E]conomics is a powerful tool for analyzing a wide-range of legal questions . . .”); see also MAXWELL 
L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) 
(describing the application of various economic theories to legal topics).  
 293. See G.A. Cohen, The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation, 8 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 338 (1979). 
 294. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 
bk. I, ch. V (1776), http://michaelatate.com/AdamSmith/b1c5.htm [https://perma.cc/M7MD-RMVT]. 
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But on the other hand, intrinsic value may not be necessary at all. 
Rather, another option would be to view this intangible right through the 
lens of the subjective theory of value. This states that nothing, in fact, has 
independent value, but rather value is derived from the fact that humans 
desire it and there is a limited supply for it.
295
 Something has value if the 
transferee wants the thing and is willing to give value for it in an amount 
that exceeds the value of the thing in the eyes of the transferor.
296
  
If people are willing to pay for the acquisition of a service or a product, 
then the law should deem it to have value. If parties are willing to expend 
funds in acquiring tax credits—whether transferable, payable, or 
otherwise—then how can one say they do not have value? Similarly, 
virtual property only has value because people are willing to pay for it. 
Shoes made for avatars on Second Life and the ability to share information 
and news on a corporate Twitter account only have value because parties 
desire to purchase the shoes and follow or advertise through that account 
handle. The same can be said of the assets that the Michigan Beach 
Cooperative court would likely consider as having independent value—
such as real estate, equipment, inventory, and other forms of traditional, 
tangible property. 
Like with tax credits, courts have also struggled with whether to give 
virtual assets the status of property. In Network Solutions v. Umbro 
International, the court was confronted with whether a domain name was 
truly property in the legal sense.
297
 That court rejected the outright 
classification of a domain name as a true form of personal property by 
stating that “a domain name registrant acquires the contractual right to use 
a unique domain name for a specified period of time [and] that contractual 
right is inextricably bound to the domain name services that [the provider] 
provides.”298 Rather than having any independent value, the rights to the 
domain name “do not exist separate and apart from [the provider’s] 
services that make the domain names operational Internet addresses.”299 
The court therefore concluded “a domain name registration is the product 
of a contract for services between the registrar and registrant,” rather than 
a true form of personal property, and was therefore not subject to 
 
 
 295. See CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 115 (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz 
eds., trans., The Free Press 1950) (“The value of goods, accordingly, is a phenomenon that springs 
from the same source as the economic character of goods—that is, from the relationship . . . between 
requirements for and available quantities of goods.”). 
 296. See id. at 114–15. 
 297. 529 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Va. 2000). 
 298. Id. at 86. 
 299. Id. 
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garnishment.
300 But courts have also gone the other way and found that 
virtual assets such as domain names are indeed property. For instance, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that a domain name is “an intangible property right” 
and holding such a right is similar to “staking a claim to a plot of land” 
and then recording such title into a registry system to put others on 
notice.
301
  
Because of the way in which courts understand—or have difficulty 
understanding—intangible property, combined with the unitary fashion in 
which U.C.C. 9 contemplates collateralizing general intangibles, there 
have been inconsistent and differing views with regard to what types of 
rights actually form property rights and which do not. Some of this may lie 
with a fundamental deficiency in the way courts are thinking about 
economic value and what constitutes economic value, particularly the 
ways in which markets for property are formed and value is created. 
Instead of providing guidance, U.C.C. 9 is mostly silent on the issue of 
what types of rights fall into the general intangible category of 
 
 
 300. Id. (quoting Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)). The court nevertheless 
recognized the similarities between a telephone number and a domain name, and that various courts 
have recognized a telephone number as being a true form of intangible personal property, and thus 
subject to garnishment. See id. at 87 (“The court in Georgia Power Co. v. Security Inv. Properties, 
Inc., 559 F.2d 1321[, 1234] (5th Cir. 1977), found such a distinction. In discussing the principle that a 
bankruptcy court cannot exercise summary jurisdiction over property unless the debtor or trustee has 
actual or constructive possession of the property in question, the court observed that ‘for a business, 
. . . telephone numbers constitute a unique property interest, the value of which increases as the 
number becomes widely known through publication in guidebooks, posting on billboards, and 
imprinting on publicity items.’ . . . . The court then distinguished the property interest in such numbers 
‘from a subscriber's rights to the telephone utility's service.’”). 
 301. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). It is noteworthy to see the divergent 
views between the district and the appellate court in this Case. For instance, the district court stated:  
NSI contends that a domain name is a form of intangible property which can not serve as a 
basis for a conversion claim. The Court concurs. There is simply no evidence establishing that 
a domain name, including sex.com, is ‘merged in or identified with’ a document or other 
tangible object. Thus, under the traditional precepts governing the tort of conversion, a 
domain name is not protected intangible property. The Court recognizes that the present 
action invites abandoning the traditional strictures of conversion to encompass forms of 
intangible property never contemplated in its formation. 
Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (N.D. California 2000) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). And then on appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated:  
The district court thought there were ‘methods better suited to regulate the vagaries of domain 
names’ and left it ‘to the legislature to fashion an appropriate statutory scheme.’ . . . . The 
legislature, of course, is always free (within constitutional bounds) to refashion the system 
that courts come up with. But that doesn't mean we should throw up our hands and let private 
relations degenerate into a free-for-all in the meantime. We apply the common law until the 
legislature tells us otherwise. And the common law does not stand idle while people give 
away the property of others. 
Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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collateral.
302
 And it is perhaps due, in part, to this silence that a lacuna has 
developed in the law with regard to how new and non-traditional forms of 
property—such as virtual property—can be collateralized. 
2. Competing, Mixed, and Overlapping Legal Regimes 
The second major issue involves the fact that most forms of virtual 
property are comprised of a mixture of different legal regimes.
303
 For 
instance, a domain name may consist of trademarks, copyrights, and non-
intellectual property related rights.
304
 Because of this mixed architecture—
where the thing is comprised of a variety of legal concepts—there is no 
one certain method for perfecting a security interest in the virtual asset as a 
whole. As a result, there is often great difficulty in ascertaining exactly 
what and where a lender should file its applicable documentation in order 
to perfect the lien. Indeed, without the ability to bind third parties as to the 
existence and validity of the security interest in the virtual property itself, 
the security has little real value.
305
 Under the U.C.C. 9 system, the process 
is rather clear.
306
 The U.C.C. records are kept at the state level—usually by 
the secretary of state or, in the case of Louisiana and Georgia, with the 
various clerks of court in conjunction with the secretary of state—and 
interested parties can search these records to ascertain whether the 
property at issue is subject to the security rights of a creditor.
307
  
However, when it comes to the intersection of virtual property and 
U.C.C. 9, a number of different registry regimes arise. For instance, a 
virtual asset, such as a domain name, might entail a number of different 
 
 
 302. Dan L. Nicewander, General Intangibles under Revised Article 9, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
REP. 169 (2000) (discussing how the shaping of the contours of this Article 9 category have been by-
and-large left to courts). 
 303. Id. 
 304. See id.; see also Fairfield, supra note 25, at 81–83. 
 305. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 196, at 277–79. 
 306. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Spearing Tool Filing System Disaster, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 283 
(2007) (“The function of the Article 9 filing system is to provide notice of prior security interests to 
those who consider taking subsequent ones (hereafter “searchers”). The holder of the prior interest 
gives notice by filing a “financing statement” in the Article 9 filing system.”). 
 307. See id. at 281–86; U.C.C. § 9-501(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014); James A. Stuckey, Louisiana’s Non-Uniform Variations in U.C.C. Chapter 
9, 62 LA. L. REV. 793, 825 (2002) (“The Louisiana Secretary of State is not a ‘filing office.’ It accepts 
no filings of Uniform Commercial Code records, nor does that office perform searches. Instead, search 
requests are processed by the Clerks of Court and in Orleans Parish by the Recorder of Mortgages. 
This system has worked exceedingly well in Louisiana since its adoption in 1990. Louisiana has 
avoided the serious time delays encountered by states which have adopted pure central filing, with a 
solitary office handling all Uniform Commercial Code filings and searches in a state.”). 
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intellectual property concepts.
308
 The name of a website might be subject 
to trademark law when it is used in connection with a website that offers 
services to the public.
309
 In such a case the creditor would use the U.C.C. 9 
filing system since courts have held that the Lanham Act does not require 
or permit the perfection of security interests within the federal trademark 
scheme; rather, it leaves such topics to state law.
310
 Similarly, what if the 
domain name and the accompanying website content together formed the 
collateral? The website content—logos, markings, and other materials—
likely implicates a number of copyright considerations, which then turn on 
whether the copyright is registered for perfection purposes.
311
 And lastly, 
there may be aspects of the domain name and the website that are neither 
covered under trademark law or copyright law—such as with customer 
lists and other logged customer information.
312
 These other intangibles 
would fall into the more general U.C.C. 9 category and be subject to state-
level perfection rules.
313
  
The cost and time of dealing with multiple filing locations greatly 
undermines the commercial law goals of efficient and clear notice.
314
 
Moreover, what if one aspect of the virtual property bundle of sticks—for 
example, the copyright portion—is allowed to lapse? Does that make the 
entire security interest ineffective against third parties? Or does it only 
render a portion of the security in the virtual asset invalid? To that point, is 
it even possible to divide the security interest into different divisible parts 
when the asset itself is unitary? If the federal trademark protection related 
to the website fails for some compliance reason, does that mean the 
creditor is unperfected on the whole? This issue is particularly difficult 
when one considers how unlikely it might be that a creditor would know 
 
 
 308. Cohen & Laue, supra note 28, at 428 (characterizing domain names as “a combination of 
‘trademark, address and telephone number’” (quoting Chase, supra note 29)). 
 309. See id. at 428–30. 
 310. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 311. Cohen & Laue, supra note 28, at 437–39. 
 312. See Fairfield, supra note 25, at 87–88 (“Virtual world creators gather enormous amounts of 
information about their customers both overtly and tacitly. Some of this is traditional personally 
identifiable information: credit card numbers, names, real-space and email addresses, birth dates (for 
purposes of screening children out of mature content), and telephone numbers for customer service 
purposes. Virtual world providers also gather and maintain logs of interactions and conversations 
within their worlds. Some maintain these logs for a very short time; others seem to have kept logs for 
years. For example, Linden Labs logs every commercial transaction within its virtual world, and in the 
Bragg case, it was able to produce records of conversations between players in virtual worlds that 
occurred years prior to litigation.”). 
 313. See id. at 85–87. 
 314. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 196, at 285–86. 
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that copyright law is even involved in the collateralization of certain 
virtual assets.  
If the purpose of commercial law is to provide a simple and coherent 
framework to effectuate the business and consumer choices of debtors and 
creditors, then this system of dual and sometimes conflicting filing 
certainly frustrates these goals. The cost and expense related to the initial 
filing and the monitoring and maintenance related to such filing can be 
tremendous, both in terms of dollars as well as human capital. Indeed, the 
system is a far cry from the U.C.C. 9’s idyllic call to merely describe “all 
the debtor’s general intangibles” and then be done with it.315 Virtual 
property’s mixed nature ill fits with the existing structure for 
collateralizing these types of assets. 
3. Anti-Assignment Clauses and Empty Enforcement 
Third, the concept that rights in virtual property are comprised chiefly 
of license entitlements creates another difficulty in making their 
collateralization both possible and valuable. While U.C.C. § 9-408 
attempts to blunt the effects of anti-assignment clauses in license 
agreements, the actual rights that a creditor can take in such forms of 
property are quite weak and, in the end, undercut the very value that the 
secured party seeks to capture. 
Terms and conditions agreements for Facebook,
316
 Twitter,
317
 
LinkedIn,
318
 YouTube,
319
 and Second Life
320
 all describe the relationship 
 
 
 315. See generally Wilbur F. Foster, Jr., Bank Account as Collateral: Deposit Account, 
Instrument, or General Intangible?, 113 BANKING L.J. 718, 724 (1996) (“The court noted that under 
the Rhode Island UCC, a security interest in general intangibles is perfected by filing a financing 
statement in the office of the secretary of state.”). 
 316. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK §§ 4.9, 18.6, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms 
[https://perma.cc/4HRU-5PDN] (last visited July 14, 2015) (“You will not transfer your account 
(including any Page or application you administer) to anyone without first getting our written 
permission. . . . You will not transfer any of your rights or obligations under this Statement to anyone 
else without our consent.”).  
 317. See Terms of Service, TWITTER § 5, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en [https://perma.cc/RHT9-
HWTM] (last visited July 14, 2015) (“Twitter gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, non-
assignable and non-exclusive license to use the software provided to you as part of the Services. This 
license has the sole purpose of enabling you to use and enjoy the benefit of the Services as provided by 
Twitter, in the manner permitted by these Terms.”). 
 318. User Agreement, LINKEDIN §§ 3.4, 7, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/BZ7M-PJPQ] (last visited July 14, 2015) (“LinkedIn reserves the right to limit your 
use of the Services, including the number of your connections and your ability to contact other 
Members. LinkedIn reserves the right to restrict, suspend, or terminate your account if LinkedIn 
believes that you may be in breach of this Agreement or law or are misusing the Services (e.g. 
violating any Do and Don'ts). LinkedIn reserves all of its intellectual property rights in the Services. 
For example, LinkedIn, SlideShare, LinkedIn (stylized), the SlideShare and “in” logos and other 
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between the company and the user as being that of licensor and licensee 
and further provide clear prohibitions on assignments. Similarly, most 
domain name agreements also provide similar provisions
321
 and ICANN 
has made no attempt to accommodate a system that recognizes the 
collateralization of domain names.
322
 This information suggests that a 
business cannot offer its Twitter, Facebook, or Second Life account as 
collateral without the consent of the actual company providing the 
platform or service. And with so many users across the globe, it would be 
unlikely or even impossible to expect that a system could ever be 
established to allow for such consent. U.C.C. § 9-408, however, attempts 
to take care of these anti-assignment clauses by rendering them null. Any 
provision that attempts to prohibit the granting of a security interest in a 
general intangible is considered ineffective.
323
 
 
 
LinkedIn trademarks, service marks, graphics, and logos used in connection with LinkedIn are 
trademarks or registered trademarks of LinkedIn. Other trademarks and logos used in connection with 
the Services may be the trademarks of their respective owners. . . . You may not assign or transfer this 
Agreement (or your membership or use of Services) to anyone without our consent. However, you 
agree that LinkedIn may assign this Agreement to its affiliates or a party that buys it without your 
consent. There are no third party beneficiaries to this Agreement.”). 
 319. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE §§ 4, 13, https://www.youtube.com/static?gl= 
US&template=terms [https://perma.cc/LM6Y-MYQD] (last visited July 14, 2015) (“YouTube hereby 
grants you permission to access and use the Service as set forth in these Terms of Service . . . These 
Terms of Service, and any rights and licenses granted hereunder, may not be transferred or assigned by 
you, but may be assigned by YouTube without restriction.”). 
 320. Terms of Service, LINDEN LAB §§ 2.2, 4.1, http://www.lindenlab.com/tos 
[https://perma.cc/GB7V-QUER] (last visited July 14, 2015) (“Linden Lab hereby grants you a non-
exclusive, non-transferable, non-sublicenseable, limited, personal, revocable license to access and use 
the Service on a personal computer, mobile phone or other wireless or internet-enabled device (each an 
‘Internet Device’) as set forth in these Terms of Service and expressly conditioned upon you and each 
of your Accounts remaining active, in good standing, and in compliance with these Terms of Service. 
. . . You may not sell, transfer or assign your Account or its contractual rights, licenses and obligations, 
to any third party (including, for the avoidance of doubt, permitting another individual to access your 
Account) without the prior written consent of Linden Lab.”). 
 321. See, e.g., Domain.com’s User Agreement, DOMAIN.COM §§ 22(a), 28(h), 
http://www.domain.com/legal/legal_useragreement.bml [https:perma.cc/3332-NQ2Q] (last visited July 
14, 2015) (“Domain.com hereby grants to User a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free 
license, exercisable solely during the term of this Agreement, to use Domain.com technology, products 
and services solely for the purpose of accessing and using the Services . . . User may not assign or 
transfer this Agreement or any of its rights or obligations hereunder, without the prior written consent 
of Domain.com. Any attempted assignment in violation of the foregoing provision shall be null and 
void and of no force or effect whatsoever. Domain.com may assign its rights and obligations under this 
Agreement, and may engage subcontractors or agents in performing its duties and exercising its rights 
hereunder, without the consent of User.”). 
 322. See Cohen & Laue, supra note 28, at 428. 
 323. See UCC § 9-408(a) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2014) (“[A] term in . . . an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a . . . 
general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, 
restricts, or requires the consent of the . . . account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, 
attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the . . . general intangible, is ineffective to the extent 
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However, § 9-408 makes a rather hollow promise. Although the anti-
assignment clause may be ineffective, U.C.C. 9 provides no way for the 
secured creditor to actually make use of the asset once a default has 
occurred.
324
 The creditor will naturally want to take control of the virtual 
asset upon the debtor’s default and, as soon as possible, move to dispose 
of it and produce funds to satisfy the debt. However, that is impossible 
under the current scheme.
325
 Indeed, U.C.C. § 9-408 makes clear that the 
licensor need not pay the slightest attention to the creditor or its supposed 
rights.
326
 What value does the creditor have in the asset if it cannot compel 
the licensor (i.e., Linden Labs, Facebook, YouTube, etc.) to recognize the 
creditor’s security interest in the property? The creditor must instead wait 
and hope for a sale of the debtor-business in bankruptcy before it can avail 
itself of the value of the license.
327
  
Further, the creditor, aside from being unable to make a disposition of 
the collateral, cannot itself make use of the virtual property.
328
 If, for 
example, a company debtor that provided its inventory and general 
intangibles as collateral then defaulted, the creditor might be able to seize 
the inventory, but it would not be able to take control of the company’s 
website or social media accounts under the theory that they are merely 
license rights.
329
 Indeed, it might very well be possible for the debtor 
himself to continue using the virtual asset even after the creditor has seized 
the debtor’s computers and other electronic equipment.330  
Lastly, while U.C.C. 9 admits that in order to actually enforce a 
security interest in licensed property the consent of the licensor is 
necessary, this is almost never going to happen with virtual assets. The 
likelihood of a creditor getting Facebook’s permission to have its security 
 
 
that the term: (1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or 
(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security 
interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of 
termination, or remedy under the . . . general intangible."). 
 324. See id. 
 325. Id. § 9-408(d). 
 326. Id. ex. 1 (“However, under subsection (d), the secured party (absent the licensor's agreement) 
is not entitled to enforce the license or to use, assign, or otherwise enjoy the benefits of the licensed 
software, and the licensor need not recognize (or pay any attention to) the secured party.”). 
 327. Steven D. Walt, Uncertainty About Free Assignment: Payment and General Intangibles 
Under Article 9, 2 J. PAYMENT SYS. L. 4, 10 (2006) (discussing the shortcomings of the anti-
assignment rule and its connection to the sale of the debtor in bankruptcy). 
 328. U.C.C. § 9-408(d)(4). 
 329. See id. 
 330. Id. § 9-408 ex. 1 (“Even if the secured party takes possession of the computers on the debtor's 
default, the debtor would remain free to remove the software from the computer, load it on another 
computer, and continue to use it, if the license so permits.”). 
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interest recognized is slim to none. And even if a large company like 
YouTube, Linden Labs, or even ICANN were open to giving such 
consent, the time and resources that would be required in order to work 
through the complex bureaucracy and various levels of approval in the 
chain of command would make doing so economically unviable for many 
creditors.
331
 Indeed, the promise of U.C.C. § 9-408’s anti-assignment 
clause is mostly disappointing in practice.
332
 And of course, if state law in 
a particular jurisdiction does not consider the virtual asset at issue to be, in 
fact, collateralizable property, then U.C.C. § 9-408 does not apply at all.
333
 
B.  Recommendations: Guiding Principles for Reform 
In considering the various issues that surround the use of bitproperty as 
collateral, current law is deficient. Even more one-dimensional types of 
intellectual property are not easily dealt with by U.C.C. 9, to say nothing 
of the complexities involved in virtual property that use a number of 
different IP and non-IP concepts to form the basis of assets like Twitter 
accounts, website domain names, and virtual world accounts.
334
 
Nevertheless, changing the overly broad and ill-defined parameters of 
collateralizing virtual property under the heading of U.C.C. 9’s “general 
intangibles” basket would of course be a complex undertaking. There are 
many different considerations that need to be taken into account, and 
creating a system that would contemplate securitizing virtual property 
involves the interests of a host of stakeholders. With that in mind, what 
follows is a series of principles and core recommendations that should 
guide any such legislative endeavor at future reforms in this area. 
1. A New U.C.C. 9 Collateral Category 
First and foremost, the time has come to specifically carve out a new 
collateral category under the U.C.C. 9 system for virtual property. At 
 
 
 331. Cf. A CASE FOR LENDER CONSENT, PACENOW, http://www.pacenation.us/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/A-Case-for-Lender-Consent.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (discussing the 
difficulties in obtaining lender consent for PACE clean energy districts). 
 332. See generally 1 JAMES P. NEHF & JULIAN B. MCDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2C.04[3], 2C.05[4] (2013) (describing the anti-assignment 
clause and its practical limitations). 
 333. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 196, at 211; see also New Jersey v. United Trust Bank 
(In re Chris-Don, Inc.), 367 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701–02 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding that a liquor license did 
not constitute property, and therefore was not subject to the anti-assignment provisions of U.C.C. § 9-
408). 
 334. See supra Part I.B. 
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various times in the past lawmakers and policy leaders have taken 
heretofore unspecified types of property and, due to market demand and 
changing economic forces, carved out new categories.
335
 Indeed, this is 
exactly what happened with health-care receivables.
336
 Prior to the 1999 
revision these types of intangible rights were covered under the broad 
rubric of “general intangibles.”337 However, over time it became clear that 
a more circumscribed framework was necessary for payment rights in 
connection with healthcare services, particularly where those providers are 
paid through Medicare or Medicaid.
338
 The reason was because federal 
regulations provide anti-assignment rules that no one is allowed to receive 
Medicare or Medicaid payments other than the individual institution 
providing the care or service—language that would exclude the healthcare 
provider’s creditors from taking the funds.339 Due to this problem it was 
necessary for the U.C.C. drafters to come up with a way to work around 
these limitations, which they did in the 1999 revisions to Article 9.
340
  
But healthcare receivables were not alone in the 1999 revision. The 
drafters also added commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, electronic 
chattel paper, letters of credit, and other forms of collateral that had come 
to require more specialized rules to reflect the realities of commercial 
practice.
341
 To that end, U.C.C. policymakers should also realize that the 
 
 
 335. See Cynthia Grant, Description of the Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COMM. L.J. 235 (2006); Changes to UCC Article 9 Effective July 1, 2013, CREDIT TODAY (July 2012), 
http://www.credittoday.net/public/Changes-to-UCC-Article-9-Effective-July-1-2013.cfm [https:// perma. 
cc/79HD-G8EF]; Kenneth P. Weinberg, Property and Transactions Subject to Collateral Categories 
Under Article 9, MONITOR DAILY (Mar./Apr. 2011), http://www.monitordaily.com/article-
posts/property-transaction-collateral-categories-under-article-9/ [https://perma.cc/C9MN-EKJQ].  
 336. See Donald J. Rapson, "Receivables" Financing Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 133, 135 (1999). 
 337. See id. 
 338. See Amy Strang, Health Care Financing: Security Interests in Deposit Accounts Containing 
Medicare/Medicaid Receivables, BANKING & FIN. L. REP. (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.bankingand 
financelawreport.com/2012/03/articles/bank-lending/health-care-financing-security-interests-in-deposit-
accounts-containing-medicaremedicaid-receivables/. 
 339. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(32) (2012). 
 340. See generally Charles E. Harrell & Mark D. Folk, Financing American Health Security: The 
Securitization of Healthcare Receivables, 50 BUS. LAW 47 (1994) (discussing the collateralization of 
healthcare receivables under the U.C.C. and federal law).   
 341.  See, e.g., Caroline N. Brown, U.C.C. Revised Article 9: The Transition Rules, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 993 (2001); John F. Dolan, Security Interests in Letter-of-Credit Rights, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1035 (1999); Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge and Pre-Default Sale of Securities Collateral Under 
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109 (1999); Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract 
and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 
(1999); Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1157 (1999); Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests Under Revised 
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of 
Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947 (1999); Harry C. Sigman, Twenty Questions About 
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time has come to carve out from general intangibles a new category of 
collateral to deal specifically with virtual property. 
In creating this new collateral category, however, it is important that 
policymakers incorporate into its definition and substance the concept that 
virtual property is indeed intangible. Policymakers should not try to 
shoehorn virtual property into some hybridized half-intangible, half-
tangible format. As Professor Moringiello has noted, the U.C.C. drafters 
have an “illogical attachment to the tangible.”342 This logic was most 
recently on display through the lens of the incorporation of the concept of 
electronic chattel paper into U.C.C. 9.
343
 Chattel paper is a set of records 
that represents (1) a monetary obligation to pay; and (2) a security right in 
or the lease of a specific good.
344
 Under the long-standing U.C.C. 9 rules a 
security interest was perfected by simply filing a financing statement.
345
 
However, in the 1990s revision the U.C.C. drafters created a different rule 
to deal with what was hoped to be a budding market for the use of chattel 
paper on an electronic basis.
346
 Importantly, unlike in the case of digital 
assets today, at the time of this enactment the use of electronic chattel 
paper was virtually nonexistent.
347
 As Moringiello so adeptly observers, 
“[t]he drafters of both Article 9 and the Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act recognized that electronic assets such as electronic chattel paper 
would probably come into existence, so they wrote provisions governing 
the transfer of these not-yet-existent assets.”348 
In order to deal with perfection (or more particularly, creditor control), 
the drafters decided that control of electronic chattel paper required that 
the creditor have control of a “single authoritative copy” of the appropriate 
documents.
349
 Of course, this was merely fictitious, because the electronic 
chattel paper (as the name suggested) was entirely digital.
350
 There was no 
 
 
Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game Under New Part 5, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861 
(1999); Steven O. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised UCC Article 9, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1077 (1999); Jane Kaufman Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 
9: Updating the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 
(1999).  
 342. Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of 
(In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 154 (2007). 
 343. See id.; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-312(a), 9-330(b), (d) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014). 
 344. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11). 
 345. See Moringiello, supra note 342, at 154. 
 346. Id. at 154–55. 
 347. See id. 
 348. Id. at 154. 
 349. Id. at 155–56. 
 350. See id. at 156. 
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actual “single” copy, and, indeed, a computer could produce many 
perfectly identical “single” copies.351 Needless to say, the market for 
electronic chattel paper never took off, and this was due, at least in part, to 
the poor way in which the U.C.C. drafters approached the issue of dealing 
with possessory-related security rights in electronic assets.
352
 Thus, in 
formulating this new category for virtual property, U.C.C. policymakers 
must not make the same mistake. They ought to embrace virtual property’s 
intangible nature and not try to reduce it to fictional tangibility. Instead, 
this new category and the contours that define it must be approached from 
a position that is divorced from the traditional U.C.C. 
possessory/tangibility-based model. Instead, provisions should be enacted 
that elaborate on and contemplate the true intangible nature of bitproperty. 
2. A Unitary Federal Perfection Scheme 
The second principle that should be included in these efforts is a 
unitary perfection system at the federal level. The need for this can 
basically be broken down into one single principle: the attempt by courts 
to create clean lines between intellectual and non-intellectual property 
rights in intangible assets has been unsuccessful, confusing, and undercuts 
the general development of commercial law.
353
 Nowhere can we see this 
play out more significantly than with virtual property.
354
  
As described above, virtual property—everything from URLs/websites, 
virtual world accounts, and social media profiles—are comprised of many 
and varied legal concepts.
355
 Currently U.C.C. 9 contemplates 
collateralization of all general intangibles under a unified scheme.
356
 But a 
number of federal statutes and regulatory regimes interface with various 
types of general intangibles—specifically intellectual property assets—to 
cause great variation in the way security interests in these rights are 
perfected.
357
 The mixture of legal concepts that comprise the foundation of 
virtual property assets makes the collateralization process all the more 
complex.
358
 A single perfection system for virtual property, whatever the 
 
 
 351. See id. at 155–56. 
 352. See id.at 156.  
 353. See supra Part II.B and accompanying discussion of U.C.C. 9 and patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and intellectual property. 
 354. See supra Parts II and III.A. 
 355. See supra Part I. 
 356. See 1 ELDON H. REILEY, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 5:28 (2015). 
 357. See supra Part II.B. 
 358. See supra Part II.B. 
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legal makeup of the asset, would be greatly beneficial in simplifying the 
otherwise fractured way courts approach virtual property. Moreover, this 
would solve the issues surrounding multiple lapsing perfections that 
current law leaves unresolved. Searching and the notice function of 
commercial law would also be made easier by a single federal system. 
Third parties would need only search in one single place for any potential 
secured interests, rather than under current law where one might have to 
search many different jurisdictions in order to fully ascertain whether the 
non-intellectual property related aspects of the virtual property were 
perfected.
359
 Naturally, efforts to create a unified perfection scheme would 
require the cooperation of Congress and the U.C.C. drafters/state 
legislatures—the lack of which has been the origin of existing secured 
credit problems.
360
  
3. Addressing Third Party Control and Alienability  
Third, this new framework must incorporate the notion that virtual 
property is contingent on third party control and recognition for its 
existence.
361
 As discussed above, servers and computers talking to 
computers is often what makes virtual property exist.
362
 Because it has no 
physical body, it can only exist by the understanding and, more precisely, 
with the authorization of a third party. Without the third party giving 
functionality to the property and the user’s ability to manipulate it, the 
property essentially does not exist. For instance, a domain name can be 
used in connection with a website in order to produce value for a 
company. However, it is only through registration with ICANN and the 
coordination of sub-party registrars that the company actually has use and 
may exercise dominion over the domain name.
363
 Tax credits also provide 
a helpful analogy.
364
 Without recognition by the IRS or the state revenue 
agency, they are essentially worthless. 
Any new formulation of U.C.C. 9, as well as accompanying federal 
legislation, must incorporate the concept of third party control. This 
necessarily means that the law will have to intervene, and even reorder, 
some of the rights and duties that typically underpin private license 
 
 
 359. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 360. See supra Part II.B (discussing the confusion between state and federal law as it relates to 
intellectual property secured lending). 
 361. See supra Part I.B. 
 362. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 363. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 364. See Odinet, supra note 34, at 147. 
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agreements. Specifically, this new virtual property legislation must be 
geared toward freer alienability. The immense restrictions placed on the 
ability of users to transfer or otherwise assign their rights in virtual 
property must necessarily be curtailed in order to accommodate the 
securitization of such assets. The prevalence of “click here and give up 
your rights” is unavoidably antithetical to the ability to use virtual property 
to generate borrowed capital.
365
  
This notion of restricting clauses that purport to make certain rights 
inalienable is not without precedent. Indeed, the Uniform Fiduciary 
Access to Digital Assets Act (Act) model legislation is entirely about 
addressing this issue within the sphere of estate planning.
366
 The Act 
attempts to address the many situations in which someone dies and leaves 
behind a host of digital assets ranging from “photographs, electronic 
investment account statements, e-mails, social media accounts, bank 
account statements, and so on” but where the person did not make 
arrangements for those they leave behind to have access to these important 
items.
367
 The Act changes this by giving individuals the power to 
designate how their digital assets will be managed or disposed of in the 
same way they can make plans for what happens to their tangible assets 
upon death (through a will).
368
 Moreover, if an individual fails to make 
such arrangements, a court-appointed fiduciary can be given the authority 
to deal with the decedent’s digital assets.369 Importantly, the Act 
“overrides any provision in a click-through terms-of-service agreement 
that conflicts with the account holder’s express instructions.”370 In other 
words, although a user agreement—for example, Facebook’s user 
agreement—might state that the rights under the individual’s account 
cannot be transferred, the Act negates such a provision by allowing the 
fiduciary to not only have access to the account but also to deal with the 
account according to the decedent’s wishes or otherwise pass the account 
on to the decedent’s heirs. 
 
 
 365. See generally Thomas P. Wolf, Note, Toward a “New School” Licensing Regime for Digital 
Sampling: Disclosure, Coding, and Click-Through, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1 (discussing 
contemporary issues with control over licensing rights by the licensee). 
 366. See Elizabeth D. Barwick, Note, All Blogs Go to Heaven: Preserving Valuable Digital Assets 
Without the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act’s Removal of Third Party Privacy 
Protections, 50 GA. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (discussing transferability problems with online accounts). 
 367. Id. at 9–10; see also Jamie P. Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud: Managing a Digital Estate, 5 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 209, 212 (2013). 
 368. See Blachly, supra note 24, at 10. 
 369. See id. 
 370. Id.  
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Note that the Act does in fact reorder the agreed upon rights and duties 
of the parties—specifically those between Facebook and other social 
media platforms and their users—in order to achieve countervailing 
societal goals: specifically, by not allowing valuable information to be lost 
upon one’s death. To that point, there is an equally compelling reason as to 
why the law should allow for freer alienability when it comes to 
securitization and using virtual property as a source of secured credit.  
On the one hand, U.C.C. § 9-408 already deals with this situation by 
negating anti-assignment clauses; but it does not go far enough.
371
 In 
essence, it allows for alienability, but without actually binding the third 
party controller. As noted above, without a provision that compels the 
third-party controller of the property (i.e., Facebook in our hypothetical 
above) to comply with the instructions of the secured party, then the 
nullification is without teeth. One might argue that there is hostage value 
in the secured party having an interest in the virtual property through its 
ability to stop the debtor business from continuing to use the property;
372
 
however, in many cases the debtor can still make use of the asset.
373
 The 
creditor has no real right to cut off the debtor’s use of the property in many 
cases.
374
 Any new scheme that contemplates the collateralization of virtual 
property should address compliance by the third party controller at the 
behest of or in coordination with the secured creditor. Because of the 
third-party nature of virtual property, forced cooperation at some level 
must be a building block of new U.C.C. rules to address virtual property 
securitization. 
CONCLUSION 
Virtual economies cause a rethinking of the way society conceives of 
traditional market economies that have for so long been dominated by 
tangible goods.
375
 While it is true that the intangible rights represented by 
 
 
 371. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 372. See Timothy G. Hayes, Note, Secured Creditors Holding Lien Creditors Hostage: Have a 
Little Faith in Revised Article 9, 81 IND. L.J. 733, 733–34 (2006); Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt 
Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2002); Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 
U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 600–01.  
 373. See UCC § 9-408, ex. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2014) (“Even if the secured party takes possession of the computers on the debtor's default, the 
debtor would remain free to remove the software from the computer, load it on another computer, and 
continue to use it, if the license so permits”). 
 374. See supra Section III.A.3; see also Chang, supra note 25, at 91–93 (providing a possible 
framework for turn-over control of virtual assets). 
 375. Lakhani, supra note 17, at 6–7. 
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assets like stocks, bonds, accounts receivable, and chattel paper 
undoubtedly form a significant form of market collateral, virtual property 
is a very different animal. Twitter accounts can come and go with the click 
of a button, and thus the value that they represent can be far more 
temporal. Moreover, since the platform itself often reserves the right to 
cancel the license without the consent of the user, the status of virtual 
property as a persistent asset is tenuous. And it is because of these unique 
features that rules meant to deal with tangible property markets are in 
many ways ill-suited for the growth of commerce involving bitproperty. 
There is a connection between the forces that drive the traditional 
property-based economy and those that operate in the realm of virtual 
assets. The two do not represent a binary system, but rather are 
interlocking. And the law of U.C.C. 9 should seek to facilitate the efficient 
and seamless convergence of these two forces in the context of virtual 
asset financing. Legal and public policy concerns relative to virtual 
property are on the rise. Scholars, policy advocates, and commentators are 
voicing their concerns when it comes to issues of taxation, bankruptcy, 
and privacy, to name a few.
376
 The nature of these assets is constantly 
changing and the legal concepts and institutions that intertwine to form the 
basis of them are not easily understood.
377
 Indeed, in many ways one must 
have at least a basic knowledge of information technology and related 
systems before one can discuss virtual assets in the context of the law.
378
 
Moreover, the many interests at play when it comes to virtual assets make 
them difficult to easily translate into familiar legal structures.
379
 
However, one thing that becomes increasingly evident is that virtual 
property has tremendous value and utility. This is true not only in its more 
traditional manifestations—such as social media accounts—but also in the 
more exotic realm of virtual worlds and other related cyber-platforms.
380
 
These assets, however, remain relatively untapped as a source of capital in 
the context of secured credit. Domain names and their related website 
adjuncts are already viewed as a desirable form of collateral, and, indeed, 
many lenders and financial institutions are demanding them as part of a 
 
 
 376. See Fairfield, supra note 25, at 81–87 (discussing virtual assets in the context of bankruptcy 
law); Leandra Lederman, “Stranger than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620, 
1623–24 (2007) (discussing tax implications); John William Nelson, A Virtual Property Solution: How 
Privacy Law Can Protect the Citizens of Virtual Worlds, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 395 (2011) 
(analyzing virtual theft and privacy laws). 
 377. See supra Part I and accompanying explanation of virtual property. 
 378. See supra Part I. 
 379. See supra Section I.A.2. 
 380. See supra Part I. 
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collateral loan package.
381
 With other virtual assets coming to the 
economic forefront, it would seem that it is only a matter of time before 
these too will be called to the table.
382
 
This Article argues that, unfortunately, the current law governing 
secured transactions—specifically U.C.C. 9—lacks the sophistication 
necessary to deal with these new forms of property.
383
 The intangible 
nature of the asset, a lack of understanding and recognition of its 
component parts and underlying value, and an overly broad legal 
framework makes effective collateralization of such property quite 
difficult.
384
 Any revision of the law of Article 9’s general intangibles 
framework must involve a better understanding of bitproperty. The 
principles set forth herein are by no means exclusive, but they do provide 
a narrower lens through which stakeholders and lawmakers can focus their 
efforts. Appreciating the uniqueness, the technology, the value, and the 
markets relative to bitproperty and incorporating these concepts into the 
drafting process is crucial to making any legislative project in this area 
effective. Commercial parties, policymakers, and legal scholars must have 
a clear understanding of the problem and an openness to new ways of 
thinking about property, technology, and new markets as the law attempts 
to address virtual property and secured credit in the future. 
 
 
 381. See supra Section I.B.1. 
 382. See Fairfield, supra note 25, at 81–87. 
 383. See supra Part III.A. 
 384. See supra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/7
